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GEIST is an academic journal sponsored by The Symposium, SJSU
Philosophy Club, in cooperation with the Department of Philosophy at SJSU . The journal is focused on publishing philosophical
papers by undergraduate and graduate students from both SJSU
and the greater academic community.
The above is the official description of GEIST. However, I hope
that GEIST lives up to its namesake and also shows the spirit behind both philosophy and those who study it. Philosophical quandaries may not be that uncommon but pursuing and trying to make
sense out of it all academically is not as common. The aim is to
encourage this sort of philosophical investigation in both undergraduate and graduate students as well as to share their ideas with
the community.
I would like to thank all of the assistant editors for all their efforts
in putting together this premiere issue of GEIST. I also want to
gratefully acknowledge all the professors on our advisory board
for their reviewing, guidance, and support. We also received help
from other San Jose State University students and professors with
various tasks and questions. Thank you all for helping to make
this possible.
Since this is our first issue, the creation of this journal has truly
been a learning process. We will be working to improve GEIST
and would appreciate any feedback.

Veritas,
-S.L.G .

INTRODUCTION

Pathways Towards Uncommon Thinking:
A Commentary
Tony Nguyen
Assistant Editor
Philosophy is not so far away like the sky. Instead it is as
close as the air. You breathe it in and out, even with your feet on
the ground. It may be a sign of the times to refer to Nietzsche. He
calls the philosopher the untimely man - the person who does not
quite fit into the traditions of society. Nietzsche himself could not
market his most important thoughts during his lifetime. His works
languished for two generations. Only recently do we approach his
thinking, and make his truths became apparent. All philosophers
dwell in the rich past, outside the present, and ahead in the future.
Philosophy itself is an ancient endeavor, much older and more
mature than the sciences. The young sciences end in -logy, yet do
not understand that the beginning of all-Iogies is logos (AoyoO) or
discourse. To end discourse is to state a final answer, full of certainty. Uncertain, filled with aporia, the living philosopher discourses with the past, engages with the dead, recollects teachings,
and makes history as fresh as a near memory.
Remembering what was, what could of have been, and what
can never be, he turns his attention to the living. Even here; even
Now; the philosopher is outside his time. Because he lacks
commonsense, he must think of what makes sense. In thinking, he
illuminates dim shadows of prejudice, makes uncanny the habits
of the obvious, rattles the cages of accepted truths and reflects back
to commonsense and uncommon sense that is truer than the original. Being untimely and uncommon, what hope does the living
philosopher have to contribute to society? To this, I cannot say,
but merely point - point to this work; point towards the eternally
recurrent future; towards the new philosophers who are again uncanny, uncertain, and lack commonsense.
This journal showcases some of the emerging talent from
new philosophers. Though the journal is based in San Jose, California, contributions came from all over the world. The first essay, "Aren't you there God? It's me Margaret", written by Joseph
Kim, echoes Judy Blume, and a child's plea to break out from her
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solitude. In trying to commune with a much larger whole, she
addresses God. Does she delude herself, because there is not God?
Who does Margaret talk to, when she talks to God? Nietzsche
declares that God is dead, and we have killed him. Science and
rationalism have killed God. This slow murder starts in16 10 century Renaissance, with the emergence of natural science. God does
not cause the rain to fall. The water cycle can be explained by
using plain physics. God does not cause the crops to grow. Biology with its auxins, photosynthesis, and photons explain the phenomena much better. If you do not need God to explain the natural
world, for all intent and purposes God becomes irrelevant to the
natural world. This metaphysical split reflects in the post-Renaissance Europe, as society splits into a moral and secular realm of
the Church and the State.
The second step in God's murder occurs in the Age of
Reason and Enlightenment. The 1810 and 1910 century philosophers
ground morality on rational and secular principles. Instead of God
dictating "thou shalt" and "thou shalt not", it is "I" who thinks, it is
"I" who exists, and thus it is "I" who exists to create values. Do
humans have the ability regulate their own behavior? Thinkers
such as Hobbes, Mills, Kant, Hume and Nietzsche answer with a
resounding "Yes!" Ethics asks, what is Good? What is right action? These thinkers answer these questions using only the human
mind. We regulate our acts through government and laws, ethics
and moral evaluations. Our actions structure the world around us
by forming contracts, keeping promises and through ideas being
exchange. Values such as happiness, freedom, creativity and harmony emerge as guiding principles to form a more perfect union.
From humans, by humans and for humans, God ceases to be a necessary to explain, justify or enforce what is good. A~ such, God
gets evicted from the moral realm to pave the way for the modem
cosmopolitan societies of the 20 th century.
Joseph Kim addresses this secular tradition in his very original essay. His opponent is AJ Ayer, a prominent spokesperson for
science and an understanding of science called Logical Empiricism. According to Ayer, we can only observe what our senses tell
us. From these observations we build theories. It is these theories
which explain the observable world. Because we cannot sense
God, we have not evidence of God. Without evidence, we cannot
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talk about God as being real with any sense. To form any theory
that is not based upon evidence is to descend into nonsense. In an
interesting move, Kim opens room for the possibility of God by
using this logical empirical notion of science, itself. He blurs the
boundaries between theory and observation. All observations are
laden with hidden assumptions - theories. These theories guide
what we can see, and how we see them. If we can train our observations with appropriate theories, perhaps we can train ourselves
to observe God. Though he does not argue for the existence of
God, he does succeed in finding a loophole where talk of God in an
Empirical way makes sense. This move is quite original and profound.
But what is originality? What role does originality play in
life? Although Kim makes some interesting points, what right do
we have to call his work original? What right do we have to call
this journal original? Both Kim and this journal rely on the work
of dead authors, people whose worlds have ended and moved on.
Kim himself evokes the ghost of Ayer, to rehash a debate as old as
the Renaissance. Given this, how can his can his work be original? If it is not original, how can he even be a profound thinker?
In Ryan Stubblefield's 'The Popular and the Profound: In
Search ofArtistic Originality", Stubblefield examines the question
of originality from the standpoint of a new artist, struggling against
the weight of tradition and the habits of social taste. This investigation differs from contemporary aesthetics by rejecting many of
the assumptions one has of what constitutes "Art" and what constitutes the "Artist". One of the dominant ideas in professional
aesthetics is George Dickie 's Institutional Theory of Art. The idea
states that what "art is" is what the artworld recognizes as art. But
if an artist can only be a true artist if others recognize him, then
how original can his art be? If his art is recognizable, then it is
familiar. If it is familiar, doesn't follow that what he has done is
not original? Even if his art is original, once the institutions have
absorbed his work, does this effect the originality? As such, the
institutional theory of art places the status of originality into question.
Is this struggle between the new and the institution mutually destructive? This is the first question that David Rodick asks
in his essay "Recovery and Recollection in Dewey and Heidegger."
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While Stubblefield maintains that the artist must forever be an outsider, the philosopher does not have this luxury. Great philosophical ideas get incorporated into the cannons. What is the relationship between the new philosophers with their new philosophies
with the world of philosophy in general? To answer this question
Rodick examines the tasks that John Dewey and Martin Heidegger
had set. This choice is interesting because the two men represent
antagonistic schools of thinking. Dewey comes from the analytical tradition dominant in America and Heidegger epitomizes Continental thought. By saying the both sought to recollect and recover philosophy, Rodick shows that the difference between the
two schools is not one of agenda, but merely that of methodology.
To recollect and to recover is to both invoke the past, then to change
past thinking to meet with the demands of the present. To recollect
is to make relevant and to recover is to clear away debris. Without
this undertaking, the past fades away into obscurity and irrelevance.
This is the charge made when critics say that academic life
is merely a study of Dead White Males. Rodick shows that philosophy can be made relevant by recovering the life-world or the
world that we mean when we ask, "How does it pertain to life?"
To make philosophy relevant to life, Rodick has to ask, "What is
life?" Rodick, through Dewey and Heidegger argued that scientific thinking has obscured life, by a certain technical way of looking at life. Where biology diverges from f3toOA.oyo; or discourse
about life, philosophy merges with cj>tAOoocj>ta or the love of wisdom. The inscriptions on the temple wall of the Oracle of Delphi
told Socrates to "know thyself'. This search for self-knowledge
starts the philosophical endeavor. The young student of philosophy learns many philosophies, philosophical systems, as well as
the critical thinking skills necessary to discern. N; young virtuosos unaware that their schooling is preparation for original thinking, they can become very versed at mixing, matching, comparing
and contrasting ready-made systems and ideas. They become so
good, that they begin to treat philosophy like a game. In this way,
the philosophy student has assumed just as disintegrated a view of
life as our biologist.
To reintegrate what we know with life, the philosopher
starts his quest for life itself. This makes philosophy, at heart, very
personal. Being personal, the philosopher cannot help but try to
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synthesize what he has learned in schools, with what he has learned
in life. By casting aside his mime's eye, and finding his mind's
eye, the philosophy student becomes the philosopher. When philosophy pertains to life, his life, the life world, philosophy ceases
to become mere philosophy, but his own philosophy. When this
happens, philosophy is absolutely meaningful to life. It is the task
of the philosopher to recover the meaning of life.
Immersed in the life-world, the philosopher sees Others.
The relationship between I and Others begins the construction of a
shared "reality". In Carlos Sanchez's "Dangerous Encounters: The
Other, the I, and Sociality," Sanchez asks, "What do I mean when
I speak of 'violent reality'?" Shows such as Cops, Stories of the
Highway Patrol emphasize the "urban jungle". News reports of
massacres in Colorado high schools, of rising gun sales, of threats
of race wars erupting in Los Angeles or Atlanta point to a violent
America. One way to understand "reality" and thus "violent reality" is to look at reality from an objective standpoint. Sociologists
and psychologist sidentify external factors, which lead to violence.
Economics and politics create depressed neighborhoods. Lack of
parental care has left children without moral guidance. Violent
images on television desensitize children. What does philosophy
have to contribute towards understanding violence that the sciences
have not provided?
Scientific explanations are third person accounts. Third
person accounts analyze phenomena by enframing being and by
viewing all being as things. Things are shaped by physical forces.
If everything comes from the outside, what is left that is my own?
To say that 1 am violent because of society, or because of my parents, or because of television presupposes that the individual is not
free, and does not make choices on their own. By saying that all is
external, humans are reduced to a mere puppet pulled along by
strings. If all of these external factors determine the actions of the
puppet, the puppet can say, "I did not murder this man. My puppet
master made me do it!" In short the scientist, in their third person
language misses what the first person experiences as "his or her
own." What is most fundamentally "my own" is my life. If 1 am
spoken to in the third person, from the standpoint of objective
knowledge that pertains to everyone in general, but no one in particular, what can 1 call "my own" experience?
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The philosopher as phenomenologist, seeks what is "own"
or "proper" to the experience of a single being. They seeks to
understand and explain general phenomena from the standpoint of
individual lives, and of a given reality. In a "violent reality", the
individual sees life as inherently alien. Moreover, danger permeates what is alien and unknown. To form a society, we bridge this
gap between ourselves and others by an act of identification, or
what Sanchez calls "analogical apperception". By making the
Other not truly the alien other, but someone who is not yet the
same, the potential for friendship exists. This possibility makes
the other approachable. By approaching each other, we form the
basis for shared relationships and thus community. Though Carlos
Sanchez makes a case that this is the phenomena of "violent reality" this does not answer the question "Are fundamentally violent?" Are we doomed to be in a state of war, because as Thomas
Hobbes puts it, we are violent, nasty and brutish?
In my essay "The Unequal World of Power and Justice," I
ask this question but place the human relationship within a power
structure. Given the fact that power differences exist, can we have
a just society? To answer this question I return to Philosophy's
roots and reread Plato's Republic. In the Republic the question of
Justice is debated between Socrates and Thrasymachus. Socrates
maintains that Justice exists independently of people's attempts to
change its meaning. Thrasymachus in contrast states that it is
people(s) who define their own values. Democratic regimes define democratic values as being just Totalitarians define totalitarian values as just, and so forth. Each regime defines their own
justice. This critique of justice shows that power and politics play
into the formulation of values. However, to what extent does might
make right?
This question calls attention to the strife that permeates
our society because of power differences. From the home with
man and wife, at work with worker and capitalist, in politics between the enfranchised and disenfranchised, in the economics between the have and have-nots, power inequality exists at all levels.
If might does make right, what recourse does a society have but to
wage a civil war for ideological dominance? If this is our only
option, then Carlos Sanchez is right. We must look at the Other as
threatening - that we live in a fundamentally "violent reality." To
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establish that fundamental reality is not violent, I show that the
mentality of "might makes right" is self-contradictory, schizophrenic and thus irrational. Though justice exists with power, Justice is not a power construct. Justice exists as an objective standard and ideal. Though we may forget those standards, those standards nevertheless exist. A just society must be a society where
the Other is not originarily threatening and thus enemy. The Other
must be a friend. In a society of friends, power differences may
arise because of circumstance and social position. However friendship transcends these conditions, in that the friend does not see
himself as master. Instead he sees himself as another equal and
uses his power to promote the welfare of his friends, based on an
objective idea of Justice.
Though I lay theoretical grounds for this just society, I do
not pave any roads or plant any signs as to how one may achieve
this end. This task is taken up by our final paper entitled "Examining Empathy: Husserl, the Other and Racial Difference." Written
by Tanya Rodriguez, she examines race relationships and investigates how races overcome xenophobia. Given that the Other is
truly other, how can I come to know the Other as friend? Rodriguez,
like Sanchez, answers from the phenomenological perspective.
While Sanchez's Other is a nondescript Other who is defined only
by their alienness, Rodriguez's Other is specifically a racial Other.
Though strangers, I can understand Others within my social circles
relatively easily. Differences in income, history and family may
make the Other different, but shared culture, music, beliefs and
ambitions give clues as to how I can understand Others. What if
the Other does not share my culture, my group history, my language, or my beliefs? What if the clues cannot be properly interpreted? Miscues between races erupt into lynchings, beatings, and
unjust discrimination. Misreadings of Others have marked a bloody
trail within our civil history. How can we overcome this large gap
between racial boundaries?
For Rodriguez, the answer is empathy. To empathize is to
consciously reflect upon the Other and to immerse yourself into
the Other. Empathy motivates contact and promotes understanding. This idea is similar to Sanchez's "analogical apperception."
Rodriguez extends this idea and applies it to the Other not only as
a subject, but also as an object. Though one can be both a subject
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and an object, the relationship between I and It differs from the
relationship between I and you. To movefrom seeing the Other as
an It, towards seeing the Other as another you is a move that expands the horizons of your world to include Others.
For the reader unpreparedfor uncommon thoughts, I urge
you to suspend your natural attitudes and explore unfamiliar terrain- a terrain where science gets questioned, where God is question, where society is rethought from first person points of views,
where the task of thinking is not to think of reality, but of life and
of its many different cutting pathways.
- T.V.N.

ApORIA

Aren't You There God? It's me Margaret
Joseph Kim
Georgia State University
Margaret I is a lady whose sense perception seems to be
functioning normally in every way possible. She has above average intelligence, and her colleagues and friends all consider her a
reliable person in every way possible. Yet, Margaret does things
that most of her colieagues and friends would deem strange and
eccentric. She prays daily to a metaphysically transcendent being
that she calls "God," and claims that she is able to communicate
somehow with God through this time of prayer. Margaret's claim
is that this is a very meaningful experience for her, and that when
she speaks of this particular religious experience she is making
meaningful utterances. Her friends though, find her speaking nonsense when she speaks about God.
AJ. Ayer, in Language, Truth, and Logic, sets out to defend the verification principle and the resulting ramifications of
applying the principle to various philosophical notions. In light of
his critique of traditional metaphysics, Ayer makes the claim that
all propositions about God' (or religious knowledge) are nonsensical (and therefore meaningless) due in fact to the principle of
verification. Ayer would wholeheartedly agree with Margaret's
friends that any sentence that describes her conversation with God
is meaningless and thus nonsensical. My intent is not to make an
argument for the existence of God, but merely to show what Ayer's
position on religious knowledge was with respect to the verification principle. I will argue that even by Ayer's own examples of
applying the verification principle to religious knowledge there can
be room for the meaningfulness ofreligious assertionsbecause Ayer
has not defended with much cogency the strong claim that all religious knowledge is meaningless. First the principle ofverification
will be examined very briefly, next the application of the verification principle to theological statements will be examined, and finally some arguments as to why Ayer has not considered all the
possibilities for religious knowledge (and thus disregarding the
claims of people like Margaret).
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The Verification Principle and it s application to

theolo~

Ayer's intent with the principle of verification is to make
the claim that a sentencecan be meaningful only if it is analytic or
empirically verifiable. If the sentence could not be confirmed in
this manner, the sentence does not have any meaning and thus is
nonsensical. Thispostulationwiththeprincipleof verification was
to furnish somecriterionby which it couldbe determinedwhether
or not a sentence was literally meaningful.' This principle then
could be appliedto any proposition, particularly those concerning
traditionalmetaphysics, ethics, and religion, to determinewhether
the statement had any meaning. Ayer states that the supposed
"weak" form of verificationis the only option,over the seemingly
"strong"form, because empirical propositions are hypotheses which
are continually subject to the test of further experience." In other
words,all empirical analysesare fallible and cannot be established
conclusively due to the fact that ''there would never be a point at
which it was impossible for furtherexperiences to go against it."?
Any and everymeaningful proposition, regardless of the degree of
empiricalconfirmation, can alwaysbe superceded by new empirical evidence. (i.e.The phlogistontheoryof heat was once accepted
as being confirmed empirically, but is nowno longer accepted as a
validtheoryofheat)So empirical confirmations, thoughtheycould
be probable,couldnever be provedto be "true" in the strongsense
ofthe word.ThusAyerconcludes thattherecould only be a "weak"
senseof verifiable in that the strongsensecould not have any possible application.
The possibility of religious knowledge for Ayeris strictly
ruled out even before his examination of theological statements.
Ayer's analysis startsby establishing thatany premise from which
the existenceof a God could be deduced is a deductive argument.
Yetonly apriori propositionscan be logically certain, and one cannot deduce the existenceof a God from an apriori proposition." If
anyargumentation for the existence of Godis a deductiveone(Ayer
seems to posit that all of these arguments are deductive), then the
premises in the argument must be certain. Yet according to Ayer,
no empirical proposition "can ever be anything more than probable." Since one cannot empirically confirm the statement "God
exists" and given the fact that any statement about God is not an
apriori proposition, there then can be no way of showing that the
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proposition "God exists" or any other assertion about a God is
meaningful. In other words one couldask, What wouldbe the conditions that would confirm or disconfirm one's belief of God?'
Since there is no way of empirically answering that question, any
religious statementis utterly meaningless.
Ayer then moves to establish the case that for the existence of God to be proven even probably, one must establish this
probability throughan empiricalhypothesis. Yetsincetheproposition"God exists" cannot be confirmed empirically, even the probability of God's existence is to be rejected. Ayerclaims that "ifthe
existence of a God were probable,then the propositionthat he existedwouldbe an empirical hypothesis... and in that case it would
be possible to deduce from it..certain experiential propositions
which were not deducible from thoseother hypotheses alone. But
in fact, this is not possible." So since one can deduce from an
empirical hypothesis certain"experiential propositions whichwere
not deducible from those other hypotheses alone" and Ayerrejects
the claim that this is even a possibility for the proposition "God
exists," the existence of God even as a probable notion is a meaningless proposition. Even if one supposedly offers up some empirical confirmation for the existence of God (i.e. suchas the regularityof the forces of nature), that sentence for Ayerwould mean
no morethan merely saying that there is such and such a phenomena. So if the sentence"God exists" serves only to describe certain
empirical experiences such as the regularity of nature, then Ayer
wouldagree that the sentence was meaningful. Yet, it seems that
the religious person claims more thanjust the mere assertment of
certain naturalphenomena. Ayerseesthe religiouspersonas claimingthat "in talkingabout God, he wastalking about a transcendent
being who might be known through certain empirical manifestations."9
Ayer'sdispute, then, is with thosewho want to posit some sort
of a metaphysical transcendent being. Using the verification principle, his claim is that any effort in trying to posit a metaphysical
being isto makethe empirical claimthatthe statement canbe shown
to be trueor false, Sincethe sentence "God exists"cannotbe shown
tobe trueor false, it is a meaningless sentence.Any sentence which
"purports to describe the nature of a transcendent God" has no
meaning since a sentence of this type purports to describe some-
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thing that is meaningless and nonsensical. So in categorizing his
position thus far:
(l) For any statement or proposition to be meaningful, the statement must be an analytic statement or empirically confirmable
(2) All empirical confirmations are fallible and cannot be established conclusively
(3) Only apriori propositions can be claimed to be certain
(4) The sentence "God exists" is not an apriori proposition and
cannot be confirmed in any way empirically

THUS
(5) Any statement that purports to posit the existence of or describe the nature of God as a metaphysically transcendent being is meaningless
Yet an interesting note to this verification critique is that Ayer's
analysis applies equally to the atheist and the agnostic. So it is not
Ayer's claim that there is insufficient evidence in positing a metaphysical transcendent being, but that since a metaphysical transcendent being cannot be confirmed as true or false that all theological propositions including atheological statements are meaningless. The atheist then expresses a meaningless proposition when
she claims that "God does not exist". Similarly the agnostic makes
no meaningful claim when he claims that the existence of God
cannot be known to be true or false for he does not deny that the
sentences "God exists" and "God does not exist" are actual meaningful propositions. The agnostic only claims that one cannot determine which of these two sentences are true. So both the atheist
and the agnostic utter meaningless propositions if they utter any
sentence that once again "purports to describe the nature of a transcendent God."lo The theist (and the atheist and the agnostic) then
cannot be accused of saying anything invalid or false, since her
propositions cannot possibly be valid. It is only when the theist (or
the atheist and agnostic) claims to be expressing a genuine propo-
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sition in describing a metaphysical transcendent being does Ayer
disagree with her.11 Thus we can further clarify (5) to:

(5) Any theological or atheological statement, either in affirmation or denial, about a transcendent God or the nature ofa transcendent God is meaningless.

Ayer further drives this point home by claiming that any propositiom that describes life after death (whether a material or an immateriial afterlife) is a "metaphysical assertion which has no more factual. content than the assertion that there is a transcendent God."12
The unintelligibility ofstatements concerning a metaphysicaltranscendent reality is examined as well by Ayer. First, the claim
by many theists that "God is a mystery which transcends the human understanding'?" is an unintelligible statement for Ayer. If a
allows that it is impossible to defme God in intelligible terms , then
one:is allowing that it is impossible for a sentence to be significant
andlto be about God. 14 Ayer then applies a similar criticism to the
mystic, and concludes that the mystic (in mystical perception) does
not give us any information about the external world; he merely
gives us indirect information about the condition ofhis own mind."
This reasoning, according to Ayer, renders the claim that 'one can
have knowledge of a metaphysical transcendent being through religious experience' as meaningless. This argument from religious
experience seeks to establish that one can be acquainted with God
as a person is acquainted with sense content. 16 A typical argument
from religious experience can be laid out as follows:
a) A person's sense perception is judged reliable (i.e. able to pick
out yellow objects from green objects with high accuracy) ifit
conforms to the socially established "rules" of sense perception
b) Seeing the color "yellow" in certain objects can be empirically
confumed (as true or false) with these established rules ofsense
perception
c) If a person's sense perception is judged reliable, then she is
making an empirically meaningful claim in asserting that she

14

GEIST
sees the flower as ''yellow''

d) If a person can make a meaningful empirical claim when she
claims to see yellow, then using the same reliable sense perception she can also make a meaningful empirical claim when
she claims to see God or to perceive certain attributes ofGod 17
So the above argument is trying to show that a person could
be acquainted with God in the same way that this same person
could be acquainted with seeing the color yellow. If a person's
sense perception is reliable in every way and thus can produce
meaningful assertions (and observations) from an empirical vantage point, then her perceptions about God should be considered
equally reliable. Ayer's interpretation of this argument is that the
religious claim ''there is no reason why one should be prepared to
believe a man when he says that he is seeing a yellow patch, and
refusing to believe him when he says that he is seeing 000."18
Ayer counters by saying if that is all that is meant by having a
religious experience, to have some experience of "sense content,"
then he does not deny the religious' person's claim. Yet unlike
merely having an experience of seeing the color yellow, the religious person claims much more than merely having an experience
of sense. Ayer's claim is that while the former could be verified
empirically, the latter has no literal significance." So the argument from religious experience like all other metaphysical assertions, being unable to be confirmed empirically, can be considered
meaningless.
The Challenges
Though one could try to critically assess Ayer's argument
from both an external (assessing the verifiability of the verification principle) and an internal vantage point, for the purposes of
our discussion we will be concerned only with an internal assessment. The internal assessment will ask the question: Ifwe accept
all ofthe conditions that are given to us for what can be considered
meaningful, are all ofthe ramifications consistent and thus cogent?
I will argue no. First, Ayer's critique of the theist who claims that
God is a "mystery which transcends understanding" is based on a
conflation of what it means to understand. Ayer claims that for
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something to transcend understanding is to be unintelligible. Yet,
this is not quite the view of most modern day theists. The claim
made by most modern day theists is not the strong claim that God
is a "mystery which transcends ALL understanding" (as Ayer reads
it), but the weaker claim that God is a "mystery which transcends
SOME understanding." The strong claim is that since God transcends all understanding, that God can only be understood from a
mystical perspective. If one were to try and describe the qualities
of God or the characteristics of God, one would utterly fail in the
endeavor for God transcends all human understanding being an
infinite, omnipotent, and omniscient being. Yet the weaker claim
though similar is a bit different. The weaker claim like the strong
claim posits that God cannot be completely and exhaustively understood, for if there is a God who is infinite, omnipotent, and
omniscient, it would make little sense that mortal beings could
comprehend exhaustively that which is infinite. Yet even though
God cannot be comprehended in an exhaustive manner, for the
weaker claim, God can be comprehended. So even though God is
still a mystery, God can show himself and be understood through
certain supernatural and natural means. (i.e. through nature, through
morality, through a holy scripture, through direct contact, etc.) If
God (being an omnipotent being) can show himself through these
natural means and can thus be perceived through these means (it
seems that ifthere were such an omnipotent being, he could make
himself intelligible to finite creatures), then certain aspects ofGod
can be understood. If the theist then makes the weaker claim, even
within the VP, she can claim that she can have some understanding
ofGod and that this understanding is enough to constitute knowledge of some of the nature of God. Ayer may grant this weaker
claim of the theist, but still claim that there is no way of confirming even some of the understanding of God. Ayer would seemingly have no problem with an empiricist theology, one that would
speak ofGod in the same way one speaks ofelectrons. This though
does not show in any manner that electrons do exist (or that God
exists), it only shows that one can make meaningful statements
about electrons. Yet, one can make an appeal to theological language in the same manner, through religious experience.
Ayer's message to the person who claims to have had a
metaphysical experience is that she could not possibly have expe-
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rienced God because there would be no way to confinn the experience empirically. This claim by Ayer that there is no way of empirically confirming any religious experience of God, is not established in any conclusive manner. My last conversation with my
grandfather was a personal conversation that nobody heard except
for the two of us, and because he has since become deceased there
would be no way to confirm that he and I actually had that conversation. So my private conversation with my grandfather is meaningless and thus has no literal significance because it cannot be
confirmed by anyone except for myself. Suppose that only my
immediate family was there to have a conversation with my grandfather and my grandfather then passes away. Now the only people
who are able to confirm that there in fact was a conversation is my
family and my grandfather. Since my grandfather is deceased, only
my family is now able to confirm the particular conversation. Thus
it could be possible to claim that this conversation is meaningless
as well because it could not be confirmed by anyone except for my
immediate family. Let us then add one more condition, and assume that the entire hospital community was somehow in the room
to be able to have a conversation with my dying grandfather, and
he passes away unto death. Now, at this point it would seem that
Ayer would be committed to the conversation being a meaningful
one because there seems to be some empirical confirmation that
the conversation in fact did occur. Yet the important question arises:
At what point do we claim that the conversation described above
becomes meaningful from an empirical standpoint? There seems
then to be no way of drawing any explicit line between that which
is able to be confirmed empirically in this particular situation, and
that which is unable to be confmned.
If we then apply this to religious experience we will see
that Ayer's argument loses some of its force. Suppose there was a
community of people who claimed to have experienced "God" and
their experiences seemed quite consistent with one another and
were not inconsistent with any of their other natural experiential
notions" , and then all claimed that they were sure that it was God.
If in fact this community was sizable enough (equivalent minimally in size to the former hospital community), then an appeal
can be made that these experiences (or conversations with God as
some like to claim) are equivalent to the experiences described in
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the grandfather illustration. Of course there could be an objection
to the fact that there are " competing" religious experiences and
such (i.e. Jewish religious experiences vs. Christian or Islamic, etc.).
Even if this is granted, it seems quite plausible (at the minimum)
that the particular community ofthose who have had identical religious experiences can be said to be making meaningful assertions
about their specific experiences to one another. (This would be
analogous to my family having a specific conversation to one another about the conversation we had with my deceased grandfather.) So unless Ayer is willing to claim that all private experiences
are meaningless, even if the private experience is experienced by
more than one person, we find his argument having lost some of
it's cogency. It is important to note that this does not establish necessarily that God exists, only that religious statements under Ayer's
own principle ofverification can be considered meaningful in some
(for now a private) manner. If Ayer claims then that all private
experiences are meaningless because it cannot be verified publicly,
that too becomes a problem.
Let us assume a scenario where there were more people
(assuming similar demographics, educational level, intelligence,
etc.) who have had nearly identical religious experiences and can
thus claim that their statements are meaningful, over those who
have not had such experiences. If the number of people who claim
that "one can experience a metaphysically transcendent being"
through supernatural and natural means (the weaker claim) outnumbers those who claim that one cannot, then it seems that those
who claim to have had the experience can make an empirically
confirmed claim that the others are "colorblind" and thus are unable to see correctly. This could be analogous to those who are
able to see yellow and red tell the colorblind person who is unable
to see yellow and red, that they are colorblind. Though the colorblind person may object that there in fact is no such thing as color,
one principle reason that color is seemingly "established'?' through
sense perception is that there exists a large proportion ofthe population that sees color in quite the same manner and are able to make
tests which show that a person is colorblind. The empirical
conflITnability of religious experience could be appealed to in a
similar manner. In Ayer's example, we see yellow through our sense
perception and it's considered public knowledge because presum-
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ably it can be confirmed universally (except perhaps by those who
are colorblind). Yet if this is the case, it seems quite possible that
the religious experiencers of God outnumber the non experiencers
in such a way that it is as obvious to them that statements about
God are in fact as meaningful as statements about yellow in this
world. So by Ayer's own example we see that there can be some
room for the meaningfulness of religious assertions. In summary:
1) Private conversations seemingly cannot be confirmed empirically, thus all private conversations and references to private
conversations are meaningless
2) Public conversations are empirically confirmable, thus are
meaningful
3) There seems to be no line in distinguishing between what a
private conversation is as opposed to a public conversation
except that the public conversation involves more people
4) It seems that certain private conversations are empirically confirmable within a specific community of conversers
5) Thus, not all private conversations and references to private
conversations are meaningless
6) Religious experiences can be confirmed empirically as a private conversation within a specific community (given the right
conditions)
7) It is plausible that religious experiences can be confirmed empirically as a public conversation given certain conditions (religious experiencing community outnumbering the non religious community)
8) If religious experience can be empirically confirmed in this
manner, then there can be some room for the meaningfulness
of religious assertions
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Ayer's response in his defense to my objections would most
likely hinge on two key components. First, that private conversationsarenot empiricallyconfirmablewithin a specificcommunity.
He would claim that for somethingto be empirically confirmable
it wouldhave to be confirmable in thepublic sense. In otherwords,
he woulddisagree with 4) above and would claim that therecan be
some distinguishing between a private and public conversation.
Thus, 5) above would be disregarded by Ayer in that no private
conversation could be empiricallyconfirmed by definitionof what
it means for something to be confirmed empirically. Second, Ayer
would reject 6) and 7) and claim that no religious experience can
in factbe empiricallyconfirmedeven ifthe religiousexperiencing
community outnumbers the non religious community. Since one
could explain these religious experiences in a purely natural manner (i.e, having a certain sense content), this is the only sense of
empirical confirmation that could occur. Ayer could also object
that the grandfather analogy is not quite analogous to religious
experience, because the private conversation in principle could be
verifiedwhile conversations with God could not be verified.
My response to Ayer would be first, that unless one can spell
out explicitly what constitutes public and private conversations,
theredoes seem to be some room for confirming private conversations. SinceAyer has not spelledoutwhat precisely distinguishes a
publicfrom a private conversation, our criticism still has cogency.
For one can make a case that certain private conversations can be
confirmed empirically(i.e. scenario of my grandfather andmy family).Second, even thoughone couldexplain these religiousexperiences naturally, this does not mean necessarily that the natural response is the only response. The theist could agree that one could
minimally explain thesereligiousresponsesnaturallyand stillmake
the claim that these religious experiences can be both natural and
supernatural. Since the theist could appeal to the community of
theiststhat have had similarreligious experiences andwhose sense
perception is judged reliable, these experiences could seemingly
be confirmed empirically in much the way their sense perception
is confirmed. Though one might in principle be able to confirm
empirically that I was able to have a conversation with my grandfather, we have seen that it is possible for a particular religious
community to confirm empirically(i.e. like seeing color) that they
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are able to have a conversation with God. Ayer could object to this
by claiming that seeing yellow and seeing God are disanalogous.
Words like yellow can be pointed to internally, while seeing God is
like seeing a table. Neither seeing the table or God is the immediate content of a specific experience. Yet even if statements about
the table (and God) can be verified by something more direct, like
a specific sense content, God's attributes as we see are verified to
the religious by something direct (i.e. love, morality, peace in one's
heart, etc.). So this does nothing to show that the religious person's
statements about God are meaningless, unless also statements about
tables are meaningless because tables cannot be proven to exist.
Unless Ayer has a response that could explain how a person who is
reliable in their sense perceptual practice in every other experience" is unreliable in mystical practice, the argument for religious
perception as being meaningful still stands.
Conclusion
Though my objections have not proved in any sense that
there is a metaphysically transcendent being known as God, it has
shown that Ayer's contentions are not nearly as cogent as he wishes
them to be. In reviewing Ayer's position on religious knowledge
(and thus giving a general overview of the logical positivist position on religious knowledge) I hope to have shown that by Ayer's
own examples there can be some room for the meaningfulness of
religious assertions thereby contradicting his claim that all religious assertions are meaningless and nonsensical. Margaret then
can be making meaningful statements by praying and speaking to
God (though this does not establish God's existence) and speaking
about her prayers to others, particularly if she is reliable in every
other way in her usage of sense perception. Though not comprehensive in it's scope, I hope to have made clear some ofthese fundamental issues that concern the verification principle and it's application to religious knowledge."

1 The title ofmy article is a word playoffofa classic book for girls
by Judy Blume called "Are you there God?, it's me Margaret".
2 God (and god) will be used in the same sense of the term that
Ayeruses them, namely the Judeo Christian God (though one could
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substitute the Islamic name for God - Allah - as well) . Usually this
God is considered omnipotent, omniscient, and all benevolent.
3 Ayer, Alfred Jules. Language, Troth, and Logic. Dover Publications, Inc. New York, 1952, p.5
(hereafter LTL)
4 LTL, p.lO
5LTL, p.1O
6LTL, p.l14-115
7This question has been posed primarily by Antony Flew.
8LTL, p.1l5
9LTL, p.1l5
10 LTL, p. 115-116
II LTL, p. 116
12 LTL, p. 117
13 LTL, p.ll8
14 LTL, p.ll8
15 LTL, p.1l9
16 LTL, p.ll9
17 This is my own version of this argument, though it has crept in
different authors in varying forms.Alvin Plantinga's "God and Other
Minds" (1967), and William Alston's "Perceiving God" (1991) can
be considered the two paragons of the argument from religious
experience. Plantinga's version deals with arguing from the problem ofother minds, while Alston's concerns the reliability ofsense
perception and it's relation to mystical perception.
18 LTL, p.ll9
19 LTL, p.ll9
20 This is the weaker claim made by most modem day theists. That
there was nothing inconsistent with the experience that would make
them think that it was not God or that they were having a hallucination. They would claim that their senses were working in every
other way, and they could not possibly be deceived in such a manner.
21 This establishing of sense perception is not infallible obviously,
only that it is established as a basic doxastic practice because of
the universality of its appointment. Put in other words, one of the
ways we fmd sense perception reliable is because people to an
alarming degree seem to have similar sense experiences. (i.e. see
that a certain flower is yellow, or red, or feel pain when they touch
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fire, etc.)
22 Reliability here can be seen in a very broad manner, so things
like having reliable sense perception, language abilities, etc. all
are a part of this notion.
23 The author welcomes comments and questions of any sort. Email
all correspondence to: JosephSKim@yahoo.com

The Popular and The Profound:
In Search ofArtistic Originality
Ryan Stubblefield
Cal Poly
I. Introduction
When lR.R. Tolkien published The Lord of the Rings, he
started the modemfantasy fiction genre;buthis work on the world
of Midile-Earth encompassed much more than just the short trilogy. He createda full set of races, creatures, and cultures, including se\eral fully fleshed out languages, which have become the
foundation for every fantasy story ever since. No fantasy writer
has dared to write about Elves that are not tall, slender, accurate
archers, skilledmagicians, and offair complexion. All Dwarves in
the literature are short and stocky, underground dwellers who are
excellent blacksmiths and favor the axe over all other weapons.
Be thatas it may. The Lord ofthe Rings is far from the best
fantasy that has been written. Many authors since Tolkien have
produced worksthat surpass the originaltrilogyin every way, and
yetif you ask any reader of fantasy literature, "Who is the greatest
fantasy writer?"the answerwill be almostunanimously in favor of
Tolkien. If hiswriting is not the best thenwhy should he be held in
such high respect? The answerof course liesin the fact that he was
the firstfantasy author,and easilythe mostoriginal. He createdthe
paradigm uponwhich all subsequent fantasy has been based, and
has always been the standard against which all other books have
beenjudged. In short, he started something new.
I am going to examinewhy artisticoriginality shouldmatterso much to us. and how the concept of originalitycan be understood in the context of Heidegger's Being and Time. There is a
conspicuous lack of discussion of art and aesthetics in Being and
Time. which Heidegger must have realized since his later work is
almost wholly devoted to aesthetics. Thus. since the discussion
willbe limited to Being and Time, we will not be simply recounting Heidegger's aesthetic theories, but will rather be interpreting
his account of Dasein in the contextof aesthetics.
A preliminary question that should be addressed is: Why
does originally matter? As a matter of empirical fact, the originalityof aworkor of an artist seemsto makea great deal of difference
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in many cases. And, in the spirit of William James, since it makes
a difference, there must be a difference. What this difference is ,
and why we should care about it, will be discussed first; after that
we will look into how the notion of originality can be cashed out in
Heidegger's terms.
For the purposes of the paper, 'originality' is not to be
thought of as the difference between an authentic painting hanging
in a museum that was actually painted and a $10 poster reproduction sold in the gift shop. The real painting from which the copies
are made is, in a different sense than I am using the word , an original Titian, or an original Hopper. What I mean to say by staling
that someone is original is that they have a certain innovative or
inventive capacity that is played out in their works. To say that a
certain work of art is original, by this usage, is to say that it is an
innovative piece, displaying something new or creative. I think the
two senses of the word 'original' are not unfamiliar to anyone, but
it is important that we not confuse the two.
II. Why Does Originality Matter?
I take it as an empirical fact that originality is a matter of
at least some concern in the art world. Exactly to what extent it
makes a difference in terms of aesthetic value or personal satisfaction I leave to the debate of others; I am only concerned with the
fact that originality matters in some way or another. The question
then, is: Why should originality matter at all to us? Why is it not
enough to look at art produced by people who are just trying to
imitate each other, or to try to imitate another artist in one 's own
artistic endeavors?
There are. I think, two questions to be answered here: Why
should I care about originality in my own work, and why should
we care about originality in the work of others? They are similar in
structure, and the answer to the second can be derived from the
first, but the: are still not the same question. In the first case, I am
involved in a project of my own. and in being involved I have a
different perspective than in the second case, in which I take up a
detached, theoretical viewpoint on the work in question. There is a
certain amount of time in which I look upon my own work in a
detached way, but that is only in moments of reflection and not
during the time in which I am actually engaged in creating it. This
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dyad of the involved versus detached perspectives is central to Being
and Time, and it would be a mistake to collapse the distinction
here.
The answer to .the first question, why should I care about
being original myself, is to be found in what Heidegger calls the
'mineness' of Dasein. Dasein 's way of being is such that it is "w
each case mine" (67)[41]. At the risk of sounding pedantic, I will
briefly elaborate on this. There is a very obvious, fundamental truth
that Heidegger captures when he writes that Dasein is each case
Urine. I am myself, and I am not you. You are yourself, and you are
not anyone else. Because of that, I matter to myself in a completely
different manner than you matter to me. My projects, my interests,
my cares are all primordially mine, even more fundamentally than
my body is mine.
For what we are concerned about in our discussion, the
repercussions of Dasein 's 'mineness' are played out in the fact that
I do not get any creative satisfaction out of your artistic project.
My creative urge will only be satisfied by a project of my own and
not anyone else's. I care about being original because my projects
are primordially more important to me. since they are mine. Again,
.this appears to be staling the blatantly obvious, but there is a certain significance that is still carries.
But, with respect to what do we care about being original?
That is. in which part of the creative process do we care about
being original? It must be something more than just the end product with which we are concerned. If that were the case, then it
seems one would be satisfied with an attempt to recreate or imitate
a masterpiece, since in the recreation one would be making a new
product, a unique one with all the small differences between one's
own and the original. and psychically appropriating it for one's
own personal satisfaction. By copying Raphael's "School of Athens," by transcribing the notes to Mahler's 51h Symphony, by rewriting all the chapters of Joyce's Ulysses, I would have created,
in each case. my own personal, unique work. The fact that someone else had done something just like it sometime in the past is of
no consequence, since no one else had produced this very work
that I did. But none of those projects will bring me any real creative satisfaction, and no one makes the mistake of thinking so.
This would be to confuse the concept of originality and restrict it
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to applying to only physical things of the world. That is, it would
be to misconstrue the work of art as 'only what it is' and limit it to
the realm of the present-at-hand. In terms of Heidegger 's account
in Being and Time, things can only be either ready-to-hand, that
which we appropriate for our personal projects, or present-at-hand,
that which is just 'there'. Works of art do not fit nicely into either
of these categories, as is readily apparent. As noted above,
Heidegger apparently realizes this later in his career and subsequently abandons this original project. Even so, what really concerns us here is that Heidegger, time after time, attacks the philosophical tradition for mistakenly thinking of the present-at-hand
as fundamental, and in this case the mistake becomes readily apparent. It is obvious that our conception of originality, in terms of
that which will satisfy our creative need, is concerned with something beyond just the creation of a unique 'thing'.
What we are really looking for is originality in the realm
of the conceptual. In the above example, we were bypassing the
conceptual part of the creative process altogether, going straight
for the product thereof. The reason why such copying of artistic
' things' that someone else has created is not satisfying is that we
are misunderstanding the work of art as just a thing instead of the
product of a process.
In fact, Borges goes so far as to suggest that the uniqueness of the actual art 'thing' is completely irrelevant to its originality.This appears completely absurd prima fade. but is actually quite
consistentwith our interpretation of Heidegger. In "Pierre Menard.
Author of The Quixote," Borges describes the work of a fictitious
twentieth century French author.Among other writings left to posterity, Pierre had written 'the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of
the first part of Don Quixote and a fragment of chapter twentytwo."! Borges goes on to say,
He did not want to compose another Quixote which
is easy but the Quixote itself Needless to say, he
never contemplated a mechanical transcription of
the original: he did not propose to copy it. ...The
first method he conceived was relatively simple.
Know Spanish well. recover the Catholic faith,
fight against the Moors or the Turks, forget the
history of Europe between the years 1602 and
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1918,be Miguel de Cervantes. Pierre Menard studied this procedure but discarded it...To be, in some
way, Cervantes and reach the Quixote seemed less
arduous to him and, consequently, less interesting
than to go on being Pierre Menard and reach the
Quixote through the experiences of Pierre Menard.'
What Pierre is trying to do is to produce an art 'thing' that is identical to that of Cervantes, but in doing so to create a unique work of
art. The uniqueness is not to be found in the physical work of art,
but in the unique, personal process in which he arrives at that end.
And Borges treats the two works as totally distinct pieces and even
analyzes the differences! "Cervantes' text and Menard's are verbally identical, but the second is almost infinitely richer;'? Borges
then quotes the exact same passage from Cervantes and from
Menard and comments on what they mean in context of their place
in history, which is of course quite different. The upshot of all this
is that it demonstrates a view of art as being not 'just what it is',
insofar as it is a 'thing', but as being the product of a historically
situated creative process.
The particular historical situation, as intimated by Borges,
is significant to a work of art. Art, and the creative process thereof,
does not happen in a timeless vacuum, but rather at a specific time
in a specific place. The products are often 'timeless', but the process itself is not. Although, even art 'things' can change with time.
Paintings can fade if not properly preserved, buildings can deteriorate or be destroyed in wars. Or, for a less obvious example, consider a piece of music, say Bach's Brandenburg Concertos. Assuming that the manuscripts are correct, it would seem that we
have lost nothing of the art work in the last 250 years. But, if performances are considered as at least a part of a work of music, as I
would think they must (just as actual buildings are just as much as
part of architecture as are the plans for them), then it is possible to
loose something as performing trends change, and especially as
musical instruments change. There is some debate over whether to
use Baroque period instruments or modem instruments for Bach's
music (as well as for most music composed prior to the twentieth
century), and depending on the relationship between a performance
as we see it today, and a performance as Bach saw it, the work of
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art may have lost--or gained, depending on one's opinion, but in
either case it has changed-something over the years .
I want to hold off on the discussion of the role of history
for just a moment and discuss the creative process itself. If it is in
conceptual creativity' that the artist wants to be original or unique,
than is it not possible to copy the creative process, the concepts of
another artist? Have we not just pushed back the problem from one
realm into another? I think such is not the case. not on transcendent, universal grounds, but simply based on a contingent fact of
our human nature. That fact is the fundamental privacy of one 's
own thoughts. One can not exactly copy the process of someone
else because, unlike the product, the process is not public. The
process consists of the private thoughts, feelings, inspirations, and
influences of the artist, none of which can be exactly shared with
anyone else. One can talk about one 's thoughts, describe one 's feelings, and maybe even point to one's major influences, but one can
not actually share the 'thing' that is one's thought with someone
else. It is in the very nature of the parts of the process to be private
and not sharable.
This points back to the 'mineness' of Dasein. Your process is your own, and mine is my own, and no matter how hard I
try, I can not be you. One is inexorably oneself, and one's identity
is defined by the limits of one's own being. If I could be you, then
you and I would not be separate beings but rather the same one. It
is, in most contexts, a contradiction in terms to say that one could
be something other than what one is. For Heidegger, Dasein is that
being which cares about its own being, and whose nature is always
a projecting of itself onto possibilities. Dasein can change what it
is currently doing, or the role that it is currently playing, but it can
not become a being whose nature is other than to project upon
possibilities. That is what is at stake in claiming that I can not be
other than what I am.
That said, even if it were the case that one could access the
process of another, one would still be unable to copy it exactly.
This is one place where the role of history comes into play. To
actually copy the process of another, one would not only have to
go through the same procedure and have the same thoughts, but
one would also have to have the same influences and the same
historical background, or else the thoughts would not mean the
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same thing. The historical situation in which one finds oneself will
be different for every person, and will create a unique set of mental
constructs in each person. Anyone of my concepts is linked to
various other concepts I have for various reasons. Everyone creates mental 'links' between concepts , and thinking of one thing
will 'often trigger the thought of another seemingly unrelated idea
because the two have been associated for some odd reason. To
fully understand and really have the same mental process of someone else, nothing short of being that person would suffice. Which
is to say that it is impossible to copy the creative process of someone else.
This is why, for example, a variation on an old theme can
still be satisfying. To try to just copy an old theme is not satisfying,
as noted above, because one is not adding anything of one's self to
the process . But to take someone else 's art work and to use one's
own unique skills and situation to produce a new creation based
upon an old idea can be satisfying. One is still going through one's
own creative process, but one is just using an art ' thing' of another
as raw material with which to work. The fugue was not a new form
of composition in Bach's time ; in fact because he wrote so much
contrapuntal music he was constantly being tormented by his contemporaries for being too old fashioned in his compositional style.
But regardless of the origin of the style, no one will deny the imagination, innovation, and originality' in Bach's use of the fugue. It
was not an original style he created, but rather an original use of an
old style, and there is no doubt he loved doing it. The story of
Faust has been written about and sung about and painted about for
centuries, and I imagine that it will continue to be a favorite subject of art works for centuries to come. Each new piece is a variation on an old theme, and yet each new artist finds something original to add: a new perspective, a new setting, a new plot twist, etc..
With that long discussion of why one cares about being original in
one's own work, I think we can now see why one should care about
originality in the work of others. We see in the work of original
artists a creative process that we admire, not unlike how we admire the athletic skill of an Olympic champion, the mental agility
of a mathematical genius, or the persuasive ability of a master orator. The ability to come up with new ideas and original pieces, in
art or otherwise, is a skill that is not necessarily the same as the
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ability to take an existing pattern or genre and create masterpieces
from that pattern. One could argue that Picasso was an extremely
original artist, though he never created masterpieces based on traditional genre. Nietzsche might also be classified as an 'artist ' who
created his own original style and fashioned his philosophical insights in that style, and who never really mastered any traditional
forms of philosophical discourse. On the other hand, one might
say that Sartre had a command of the philosophical ideas that came
before him, and was able to produce many masterful works of literature, and a few of philosophy, based on those ideas, even though
he had few of his own that were not in large art indebted to the
tradition. There is a certain risk in using these examples since my
interpretation is far from academic dogma, but the point can still
be made I think even if one objects to these examples.
Thus , there is something in the works of original art that
we can admire, above and beyond the normal aesthetic qualities
they might have. There is a great deal of literature about the relationship between originality and the aesthetic value of art, and I
prefer to leave the debate to others, but I do want to assert that an
original art work does have some added 'value' just because of its
originality. In a certain sense, it can be seen as another category on
which we judge works. In judging paintings we might consider
form, color, subject matter, one's emotional or intellectual reaction, the level to which the artist accomplished what he was trying
to accomplish, the special historical situation in which the painting
was created, and personal taste among other things. Originality, in
many cases, belongs on that list. Some people admire originality
more than others, but it is not an uncommon standard. For example,
many people in my experience do not personally like the work of
Picasso, but they still admire his originality and respect him on
that basis.

III. Originality in Being and Time
We are going to shift gears now and consider how to explain the concept of originality in terms of Heidegger's account of
Dasein in Being andTime. As noted in the introduction, there is no
explicit mention of aesthetics in Being and Time, so we will be
taking a certain interpretive liberty with what Heidegger actually
does write. Be that as it may, I think there is a relatively straight-
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forward interpretation that naturally falls out in this case.
The first item of note is that the concept of originality for
Heidegger is necessarily historical, as touched on previously.
Dasein, Heidegger tells us, is first and foremost a being-in-theworld. It finds itself thrown into an environment; it is always alreadY somewhere. Also, Daseinis fundamentally a being-with-others. It is a part of Dasein's nature to have the capacity to interact
with other Daseins in a different manner than a table might be said
to interact with anything (if such a statement about a table can
even be made intelligible in Heidegger's terms) . Thus, Dasein is
always already in a world with people, which we might loosely
call a culture' , or society. And not onIy is Dasein in a culture, but it
is in a culture now. or before, or later.. .there is an undeniable element of time that is also involved. The originality of an idea then
will not be a transcendent, universal property, but rather will always be relative to the culture in which a particular Dasein finds
itself. Ideas that were new in medieval Europe, the mechanical
clock for example, had been around for centuries in ancient China.
But, the idea was still original or medievalEurope. Beethoven was
the first composer to use trombones in a symphony. When he first
did it, it was an original idea...but if someone were to do it now, as
is often the case, it would no longer be original. Why? It's already
.been done in the history of our culture; it is no longer a new idea.
The ' newness ' of an idea is contingent on historical facts and specific cultural location. What all this points to is that any attempt to
explain originality without a historical perspective will necessarily fail.
Now, we finally move to the analysis of Being and Time.
Originality can be understood within Heidegger's framework as a
response of the authentic artist to the' 'leveling down " and "tranquilizing" functions of the 'they'. Originality is authentic existence seen in the mirror of artistic expression. The authentic artist is
not satisfied with reproducing overplayed, ready-made, common
thought for the masses, as the inauthentic artist is. The inauthentic
artist is lost in the anonymity of the ' they' , and is not concerned
with what is profoundly ' his ' . By identifying with the ' they' , everything seems his, yet nothing really is. Though, just as all Daseins
must go through a stage of inauthentic existence, so must all artists
go through a stage of inauthentic expression, the learning stage so

32

GEIST

to speak. But, eventually, one hopes to see the artists break out of
the "dictatorship of the 'they" and wake up to authentic experience (and cynicism, as Sartre would have it).
Let us consider the 'they' more closely. The 'they',
Heidegger writes, is characterized by "averageness."
The 'they' maintains itself factically in the averageness of that which belongs to it, of that which
it regards as valid and that which it does not, and
of that to which it grants success and to that which
it denies it. In this averageness with which it prescribes what can and may be ventured, it keeps
watch over everything exceptional that thrusts itself to the fore. Every kind of priority gets glossed
over as something that has long been well know.
Everything gained by a struggle becomes just
something to be manipulated. Every secret loses
its force. This care of averageness reveals in tum
an essential tendency of Dasein which we call the
'leveling down' of all possibilities of Being for it.
(165)[127]
This characterization of the 'they' rings bells of similarity to
Nietzsche's descriptions of the 'herd' and 'herd mentality'. What
the 'they' tries to do is keep everything average. 'They' watch out
for anything new, anything different. .. anything original; and try
to 'level down' any such things they find. 'They' avoid profundity
and are "insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness and thus never get to the 'heart of the matter'" (165)[127].
When faced with something which "thrusts itself to the fore," 'they'
usually do one of two things, either (1) obscure it so as to hide it
from view...not allow it to become public, or more commonly (2)
make it seem familiar and common, accessible to all, i.e. melt down
the profoundness of the work until it seems 'just like anything else'.
William James understood this phenomenon in terms of philosophical theories. All philosophical ideas run the "classic stages of a
theory's career" says James. "First, you know, a new theory is attacked as absurd; then it is admitted to be true, but obvious and
insignificant; finally it is seen to be so important that its adversaries claim that they themselves discovered it."4 In the case of the
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'they', things rarely, if ever, get beyond the second stage of being
seen as obvious and insignificant.
Originality then can be seen as a revolt specifically against
the 'idle talk' of the ' they' , that faculty by which 'they' make everything seem to be understandable and common. One attempts to
firmly ground one's own individuality in something profound,
something not average and common but something new and different, something that is distinctly one's own. And why should this
be? Again, we point back to the 'mineness ' of Dasein as discussed
in the first part of the paper. I care about what is distinctly mine; I
want to create something that specifically belongs to me.
Of course, the 'mineness' of any work eventually fails, in
a certain sense, because 'they' take it over and make it common
and average with a superficial interpretation. It becomes a work
which can be understood and enjoyed by all, a public work with a
public interpretation and is no longer limited by the intentions of
the its creator. In the 'idle talk' of the 'they'. "What is said-in-thetalk gets understood; but what the talk is about is understood only
approximately and superficially...it feeds upon superficial reading"
(212)[168-9] . That is to say. people' understand the words being
said, but fail to understand the profound meaning behind them.
when there is a profound meaning to be found. This superficiality
of the 'they' is one reason why the artist is always so frustrated and
misunderstood on a large scale. He or she has to be misunderstood;
'they' demand so. "They' profoundly understand nothing, so to be
widely understood is to be widely misunderstood in one's profundity, or alternately to be only partially understood. As Borges says,
"Fame is a form of incomprehension, perhaps the worst." 'They'
do not seek to understand, but merely to distract themselves, to
take a break from their overworked life.
When curiosity has become free, however, it concerns itself with seeing, not in order to understand
what is seen but just in order to so. It seeks novelty only in order to leap from it anew to another
novelty...curiosity is concerned with the constant
possibility of distraction. It concerns itself with a
kind of knowing, but just in order to have known.
(216-7)[172]
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This kind of knowing, not to understand but just to say
one knows, can be found abounding in the sound-bytes and trivia
which people love to show off. But true understanding, one who
cares about actually comprehending instead of just 'having been
there' or 'having read that', is a rare, all-too-rare, characteristic.
Walter Kaufmann, in the introduction to his translation of Goethe's
Faust, makes a very poignant attack-in a characteristically arrogant tone--on such 'knowing just to know', or in this case, 'readingjust to say one has read'. He did not translate all of part two of
Faust, only selected portions of it, and says to the reader, "It is my
hope that those who would like to enjoy Goethe's Faust-ses opposed to those who want to be able to say that they have read it, all
ofit-may find the present version readable from beginning to end,
and as faithful as any."
Not only does the 'they' avoid profound understanding in
itself, it positively discourages any single Dasein from following
through with the latest gossip, or looking into the details of the
latest happening, i.e. from gaining a profound understanding of
that of which 'they' have only a passing and superficial understanding.
In the ambiguity of the wa y things have been publicly interpreted, talking about things ahead of the
game and making surmises about them curiously,
gets passed off as what is really happening while
taking action and carrying something through gets
stamped as something merely subsequent and unimportant. (218)[174]
One is always fighting against the current, so to speak, when one
takes a deep look into anything, in our case an artist or a work of
art.
What starts out as a revolutionary idea, a subversive twist
in the art world, is always consumed by the all-encompassing 'they'.
It is only a matter of time before an artist goes from being an 'eccentric original' to being classified as 'basic repertoire'. Eventually, even the most outrageous art becomes subsumed and is declared suitable for the public by the 'they' . Consider the track 4' 33"
by John Cage. The performance is as follows: the pianist is instructed to walk out on stage and sit down for 4 minutes and 33
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seconds, without playing a single note, and then get up, bow if
appropriate, and walk offstage. It is hardly conventional, and yet it
is written about in music history books just pages away from Mahler
and Wagner. The gross break with convention that Cage makes is
leveled down to 'just another phase' in music history, no different
from any other change. In a certain superficial sense that may be
said, but to reduce all works of artistic originality to 'just another
phase' is a flagrant oversimplification and a complete misunderstanding, or lack of understanding as the case may be, of the profundity of the artist at hand. But, 'they' are an indefatigable bunch,
and will always, in the end, win out. In a recent article in Lingua
Franco, an English professor from the University of VIrginia recounts the story of his high school days, specifically his philosophy teacher who changed him from a football player to an academic. He says,
What Meyers taught-c-or at least what I gleaned
from him-is that anything that's been successfully institutionalized, however rebellious it may
seem or however virtuous, is stifling. What's called
subversion only lasts for an instant in a school or
a hospital or a home; it's quickly swept up to become part of the protocol, an element of "the way
we do things around here."?
I doubt that the author was consciously aware of the Heideggerian
ring to his article, but nevertheless it illustrates my point. 'They'
simply do not have the capacity to profoundly understand anything.
Of the many devious methods the 'they' has to cover up
originality, one is by conceptual pidgin-holing art and artistic movements. These are the notorious'-isms ' which the artists themselves,
in most cases, usually despise, and for good reason. The net effect
of the titles is to distill the original and profound thought of several
different artists down into something that is palatable for the average Joe. There is a certain place for the titles, especially in the case
where the artists themselves create the title (e.g, cubism), but they
are constantly misused as a shallow replacement for inquiring into
the specific artists, instead of a tool to assist a deeper understanding. By way of these ready-made categories, one is relieved of
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actually having to work through and understand the work of the
individual artists themselves, "Why should [bother reading all those
French guys, you read one existentialist, you've read them all."
Titles are presented as ' all there is to know', such that one can
simply read the two-column article in Time magazine, or hear the
two-minute blurb on CNN and supposedly be done with it all and
have a full understanding. This is the "tranquilizing" effect of the
'they' in full effect. All new concepts are watered down and softened for the inauthentic Dasein to be able to handle without disrupting his or her everyday life. The deep thought that a profound
understanding of an artist can produce is exactly, what the inauthentic Dasein is trying to avoid, and 'they' are quite happy to
oblige. This "tranquillity," the ready-made superficial understanding of everything in order to not 'rock the boat' or disrupt the average, everyday, non-reflective existence, is exactly what the original artist threatens.

ru

Conclusion

The inevitable fate of the artist then seems to be that of
one always misunderstood in one's aims and glossed over in one's
profundity. The nature of the 'they' is characterized by "averageness," which in tum is characterized by a lack of profound understanding. Only in Lake Woebegone, where "everyone is above average"-never mind the manifest paradox in everyone being above
average-could an original artist possibly be widely understood
and truly appreciated.
But, [ think if this principle is understood, then the artist
should be able to lessen his or her frustration. If one aims to influence an elite group instead of the average herd, that is those who
are actually 'in the know' as opposed to those who pretend to be.
then one can achieve a level of success and satisfaction at being
profoundly understood. As Nietzsche writes. "All the nobler spirits and tastes select their audience when they wish to communicate: and choosing that one at the same time erects barriers against
'the others.' :" This attitude requires a certain elitist anti-egalitarianism that is not very democratic or politically correct, but there
comes a point when one must choose to be profound or popular.
One would hope that at least the artist, of all people, would choose
profundity.
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Recovery and Recollection in Dewey and
Heidegger
David Rodick
University ofSouthern Maine
Introduction
The articulation of a new philosophical position is usually
a proposal for change by means of a negation of the past. This is
because the new position is viewed as an improvement upon a past
one that is now viewed as naive and unsophisticated. For example,
Descartes viewed his philosophy as a vast improvement upon that
of St. Thomas, regardless of Descartes' fundamental indebtedness
to him. The same point can be made about the relationship between Locke and Descartes. Perhaps the most telling example of
philosophical positions being proposals for change at the expense
of the past are those arguments of philosophical analysts who see
themselves as "meta-historical ... [and] protected from the degradation that inevitably causes visions of the world to decay,"!
Philosophical "recovery" involves change; but recovery
involves more than simply change. Recovery implies a change in
the present but only through the appropriation of some key features of the past. Change, therefore, is a necessary condition for
recovery, but not a sufficient condition. In order to undergo recovery, one must creatively affect the future by enhancing the present
through a selective use of the past. Recovery has a temporal dimension. Perhaps with the exception of Plato, "change" has been
the prevailing theme in philosophy at.the expense of "recovery."
However, two important thinkers in the modern tradition that speak
directly to the importance of the role of recovery in philosophy are
John Dewey and Martin Heidegger.'

The Project of Recovery
The Deed to recover philosophy implies that philosophy

has gone astray at the present time. In order for both Dewey and
Heidegger to make this claim, each had to be living in a period
when philosophy was not functioning appropriately. In Dewey's
case, the prevailing philosophical positions that confronted him as
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a young man were atomism and Hegelianism. Dewey adopted the
latter position because it allowed for the possibility of unification
in the world.' However, Dewey eventually realized that believing
in the Hegelian Absolute ultimately insulated him from dealing
with the particularity of human experience. In order to respond to
"the pressure of concrete experience," Dewey abandoned Absolute Idealism in favor of a "naturalism" that would enable him to
deal with real "problems of men" while still allowing for the possibility of organic unity.
For Heidegger, the two prevailing philosophies of the day
were neo-Kantianism and Husserlian phenomenology." NeoKantianism basically reiterates the famous "phenomena-noumena"
distinction of Kant. In doing so, one could argue that NeoKantianism applies a divisive schism to the world due to the manner in which it creates different realms of being. This version of
scholastic formalism would offer little to someone who was coming to philosophy looking for a "fundamental ontology" or comprehensive theory of Being.' Husserlian phenomenology, however,
seemed to offer an attractive option. Husserl advocated the elimination of "dogmatic constructions" and a return to "the things themselves." On a strictly programmatic level, Husserlian phenomenology seemed to have the power to offer radically new vision of the
world. But upon closer scrutiny, with its emphasis upon transcendental subjectivity and the "bracketing" (epoche) of the natural
attitude, was Husserlian phenomenology another version of
philosophical formalism? Heidegger will develop a more radical
type of phenomenology than Husserl in the ancient Greek sense of
a legein ta phainomea
which would "let that which shows itself be seen from itself in the
very way in which it shows itself from itself."
For both Dewey and Heidegger, the solutions to
philosophy's problems are not achieved through more elaborate
constructions, but through the recovery of some of the most basic
insights from the past into the present. According to Dewey:
There is a special service which the study of philosophy may render. Empirically pursued it will
not be a study of philosophy but a study, by means
of philosophy, of life-experience. But this experience is already overlaid and saturated with the
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products of the reflection of past generations and
by-gone ages. It is filled with interpretations, classifications, due to sophisticated thought, which
have become incorporated into what seems to be
fresh, naive empirical material.... If we may for
the moment call these materials prejudices ... then
philosophy is a critique of prejudices. These incorporated results of past reflection, welded into
the genuine materials of first-hand experience, may
become organs of enrichment if they are detected
and reflected upon. If they are not detected, they
often obfuscate and distort. Clarification and emancipation follow when they are detected and cast
out; and one of the great object of philosophy is to
accomplish this task.'
Dewey is making three basic points in this passage. First,
the philosophical tradition has distorted experience. Second, there
exists the possibility of a return to a level of experience that is
fresh, and not distorted by tradition. Third, the return to this level
of experience can be liberating and enriching. Heidegger is making the same points in the following:
If the question of Being is to have its own history
made transparent, then this hardened tradition must
be loosened up, and the concealments which it has
brought about must be dissolved. We understand
this task as one in which by taking the question of
Being as our clue, we are able to destroy the traditional content of ancient ontology until we arrive
at those primordial experiences in which we
achieved our first ways of determining the nature
of Being-the ways which have guided us ever
since."
Neither Dewey nor Heidegger wanted to transcend the
philosophical tradition completely; they both realized that it is undesirable, if not impossible, to do so. The approach Dewey takes
in his published works places him clearly within the philosophical
tradition regardless of the innovation that his works displays. Like-
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wise, even Heidegger's talk of "destruction" does not place him
outside of the tradition-Heidegger's Beingand Time is written in
the language of transcendental metaphysics. Even after his famous
Kehre, there is still an unquestionable dependence upon tradition
in Heidegger's thought. Instead of transcending the philosophical
tradition, Heidegger and Dewey wanted to overcome that tradition
in order to uncover a level of experience which the constructions
of tradition have sedimented over. Both Dewey and Heidegger are
reacting to a tendency in philosophy which Whitehead called "the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness." According to Whitehead, philosophy takes the derived, refined results of reflection and mistakes those results as being both historically and ontologically primary. For Dewey, an example of this fallacy is the Cartesian "epistemological industry" which grounds all knowledge upon a detached individual Cogito, or consciousness. Descartes was only
able to arrive at the theoretical existence of the Res Cogitans after
he methodically removed himself from his existential context. Prior
to this removal, Descartes was embedded in a context or matrix of
influences. From a Deweyan perspective, the philosophical tradition failed to realize that "apart from a specific concrete environment, the individual is a sheer abstraction." Heidegger, in a similar fashion, criticizes the philosophical tradition for establishing
the act of "knowing" as the primary mode of relating to the world
when, in fact, knowing is founded upon a more primordial relationship to the world which he referred to as Zuhandenheit, or
"readiness-to-hand." For both Heidegger and Dewey, the theoretical perspective that is exhibited by science and philosophy is
grounded in a pre-theoretical awareness. 10
Both Dewey and Heidegger would agree that some of the
most basic ways in which humans experience the world have been
significantly re-worked by the philosophical tradition because, according to Heidegger, Descartes ignored the Being of the Sum. 11
Instead of viewing human beings as Res Cogitans who, through
the application of mathematical reasoning, objectively represent
the world, Dewey and Heidegger see human interaction with the
world as mediated through a "pragmatic intentionality." For both
thinkers, humans are not autonomous, self-enclosed Cogitos but
are, to use a Heideggerian term, "being-in-the-world.t''? From
Dewey and Heidegger's perspective, the world is not primarily the
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space of mathematical relations that receives a subjective coloring
according to the particular mood of the person perceiving it. HuJDan involvement with the world is always undergone from the
perspective of a subject who is "engaged?" in the world; the disinterested observer is an intellectual abstraction." Heidegger's faJDOUS example is of the craftsman in the workshop. IS The hammer
of the craftsman is not an objective instrument. The hammer assumes the shape of the craftsman's hand in a particular way; it
works in concert with a network of other tools all for the purpose
of producing a product which is itself part of a larger network of
relationships. The world ofthe craftsman is, according to Heidegger,
"sighted" through a lens that is colored by his pragmatic intention.
Dewey emphasized this very same point in his famous article "The
Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology":
The fact is that stimulus and response are not distinctions of existence, but teleological distinctions,
that is distinctions of function , or part played, with
reference to reaching or maintaining an end."

The Dream and the Nightmare
For both Dewey and Heidegger, thinking always occurs
within an existential context." It is on this point that Dewey and
Heidegger clearly take issue with the philosophical tradition. The
modem philosophical tradition, stemming from Descartes, has
tended to view thinking from the perspective of a pure act in which
the Cogito represents the world through a type of action at a distance. But according to Heidegger, "the perceiving of what is known
is not a process of returning with one 's booty to the ' cabinet' of
consciousness after one has gone out and grasped it."lB
The purity of thought, or the degree in which it is unaffected by any guiding influences, has also been determined to be
the basis for the objectivity of thought. But the relationship between thought and its object is not pure.'? The relationship between though and objectivity is more appropriately conveyed
through the German words for "object" (Gegenstand) and "representation" (Vorstellung). If one looks at the etymology of these
terms, objects literally "stand-against" a consciousness that "places"
(Stellen) them before (vor) itself. However, thinking does not con-
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sist of pure intentionality, or the graspingof something from a distance. Instead, thinking arises out of the contextual totalitywithin
which subjects and objects reside. The viewing of thought within
such a context allows for the dynamic relationship that exists between theinfluenceof the world andthe creative powerof thought.
Thoughtis constitutive or, to use a Deweyan term, formative."20
For both Dewey and Heidegger, thinking allows one to
takea precarious, unintelligible situation and to transformthatsituation into an intelligible one." However, it is important to note
herethat this transformation is not supposedto obtrusivelyimpose
a manipulative conceptualframework uponthe initial situation that
woulddistort it. Instead, thinkingshould allow for a type of transformation that preserves the basic integrity of its object. In
Heidegger's words, thinking should allow for its object "to proceed into a produced.':"
The process through which thinking is able to articulate
beingis referred to by both Dewey andHeidegger as "projection."
Projection is the process through which a matrix of intelligibility
is directed towards the worldfor the purposeof renderingtheworld
intelligible. Accordingto Dewey, philosophy"terminates, whether
so intended or not, in a projection of [the influential beliefs that
underlie culture] into a new perspective which leads to new surveys of possibilities." At a fundamental level, it is imperative that
the projection is conducive to the uncovering of possibilities; in
ocularterms,the projectionshould allowfor peripheralas opposed
to single-vision. The creative role of projection is emphasizedby
Heideggerin the following:
Layingthe foundations for thesciencesin this way
is different in principle from the kind of 'logic'
which limps along after, investigating the status
of some science as it chancesto find it, in order to
discoverits 'method'. Laying the foundations, as
we havedescribedit, is rathera productivelogicin the sense that it leaps ahead, as it were, into
some area of Being, discloses it for the first time
in the constitution of its Being, and, after thus arrivingat the structureswithinit, makesthese availableto the positivesciences as transparent assignments for their inquiry,">
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Dewey and Heidegger each recognize a "scientific" and a
"pre-scientific" level of knowing; they also are in agreement that it
is both necessary and desirable that the scientific knowledge be in
some ways more refined and discriminating than pre-scientific
knowing. However, the danger facing thinking is the possibility
whereby a projection is put in place which imposes scientific modes
of thought upon pre-scientific modes of being and which results in
makes the latter conform to the fanner. According to Dewey:
[thinkers] transmute the imaginative perception of
the stably good object into a definition and description of true reality in contrast with lower and
specious existence.... Thus they remove from actual existence the very traits which generate philosophical reflection and which give point and bearing to its conclusions. In briefest formula, "reality" becomes what we wish existence to be....25
Heidegger will take this point further than Dewey by insisting that the way in which thinking has been historically practiced--except by the pre-Socratics-has necessarily caused thinking to restrict the possibilities which its object may exhibit. According to Heidegger:
In metaphysics reflection is accomplished concerning the essence of what is and a decision takes
place regarding the essence of truth. Metaphysics
grounds an age, in that through a specific interpretation of what is and through a specific comprehension of truth, it gives to that age the basis
upon which it is essentially formed. This basis
holds complete dominion over all the phenomena
that distinguish the age."
Dewey and Heidegger begin to part company on the issue
of the possibility of controlling the projections of thought from
dominating the fainomenon, or the way in which things appear
within experience. Dewey is generally optimistic about issue of
the ability of thought to be controlled by humans as opposed to
humans being controlled by thought:" and he endorses the experi-
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mental method as a way to mitigate this potential problem . For
Dewey, thinking that is conducted within a democratic, pluralistic
context facilitates solutions as opposed to imposing a solution upon
a situation. However, Dewey 's optimism regarding the efficacy of
his experimental method seems to prevent him from recognizing
the possibility that the resulting projections could ultimately be
insulating as opposed to liberating. This optimism, and the social
consequences Dewey thinks it will engineer, is Dewey's dream."
Heidegger, on the other hand, is much more bleak about
the constructive possibilities of human thought . He sees the dominance of scientific-technological modes of representing the world
as the supreme danger facing Western civilization. For Heidegger,
no philosophical method and no social program can counter the
current momentum of technology; Dewey's dream is Heidegger's
nightmare.
...the last 30 years have made it clearer
that the planet-wide movement of modern
technicity is a power whose magnitude in determining [our] history can hardly be overestimated.
For me today it is a decisive question as to how
any political system-and which one-ean be
adopted to an epoch of technicity. I am not convinced that it is Democracy.... [Democracy is a]
half-way measure, because I do not see in [Democracy] any actual confrontation with the world
of technicity, in as much as behind [Democracy] ,
according to my view, stands the conception that
technicity in its essence is something that man
holds in his hand. In my opinion, this is not possible. Technicity in its essence is something that
man does not master by his own power,"
From Heidegger's perspective, Dewey's thought suffers
from the naivete of most Western thinking in the way that it believes human activitity can ultimately transform the world. For
Heidegger, human activity is only one aspect of a relationship that
exists between man and Being. "Being" is one of the terms
Heidegger uses to express the ontological ground which causes
beings, or entities, to be present. A conception of Being "holds
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sway" or dominates a given historical epoch; Heidegger referred
to this power of ontological determination as "the history of Being." Currently Western civilization is in the grip of the epoch of
''technicity,'' or the era in which beings appear as potential resources
for technological consumption.
. However, the history of Being does not always follow the
linear laws of history; it is, as Heidegger liked to say, "without
why." When confronted with the dominance of technology and the
fateful, historical power of Being, Heidgger will put forth an extremely non-Deweyan position. Heidegger announces that:
... philosophy will be unable to effect any immediate change in the current state of the world. This
is true not only of philosophy but of all purely
human reflection and endeavor. Only a god can
save us. The only possibility available to us is that
by thinking and poetizing we prepare a readiness
for the appearance of a god ....30
Heidegger's proclamation denies any pragmatic efficacy
to philosophy. Dewey's experimental naturalism, from Heidegger's
perspective, either simply continues the tradition of Westem metaphysical thinking (in this case a naturalistic metaphysics) or, it has
"dissolved [philosophy J into the individual sciences: psychology,
logic, political science,'?' Heidegger's repudiation of traditional
philosophy is succinctly and powerfully captured in his claim that
"only a god can save us."

Conclusion: The Thm to Art
Are the positions that have been reached concerning Dewey
and Heidegger as incommensurable as they seem? Perhaps some
common ground can be reestablished between Dewey and
Heidegger around the subject of art. For Dewey, cognitive and aesthetic experience are different only in degree, not kind. Cognitive
experience is fundamentally aesthetic in nature-the statements of
science are put forth within a vital context consisting of an environmental background that is mediated through "selective interest". It is this context of selective interest that has the power to be
ontologically determinative. In Dewey's words, "the history of
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human experience is the history of the development of arts."32
For Heidegger; the "concealing" language of metaphysics and technology is enunciated within the context of a "revealing" which provides a clue to a richer perspective. According to
Heidegger:
But might there not be a more primally granted
revealing that could bring the saving
power
into its first shining forth in the midst of the danger, a revealing that in the technological age rather
conceals than shows itself?
.... Such a realm is art. But certainly only if reflection on art, for its part , does not shut
its eyes
to the constellation of truth after which we are
questioning. 33
Could a dialogue between Dewey and Heidegger be reestablished around the topic of art or the aesthetic dimension of experience?This topic is too complex to resolve here. For Heidegger,
turning to art would put one closer to the process of "revealing", or
aleqea , that provides the ontological (ab)grund which allows beings "to be.''This experience has been totally eclipsed in the epoch
of technicity. From Heidegger's perspective, this kind of revealing
would provide the necessary groundwork for the thinking that is
necessary to "prepare a readiness for the appearance of a god."
Likewise for Dewey, turning towards art would allow for the aesthetic dimension of experience to be more thematic, allowing for a
richer view of experience than is currently afforded through the
narrow lens of the positive sciences. Conflicts between Deweyans
and Heideggerians will of course remain; but at least Heideggerians
and Deweyans could temporarily align themselves through a shared
activity even if they must ultimately part company. Perhaps we
can seek comfort in a sort of temporary rapprochement between
these two thinkers-something slightly akin to what Nietzsche's
meant when he said, "a new form of insight breaks through .. ,
which merely to be endured needs art as a protection and remedy."34
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IGiovanna Borradori, The American Philosopher (Chicago: The
University of Chicago Press, 1993), 12.
2"Recovery" is Dewey's term; Heidegger uses the German word
wiederhollen (Wiederholung) meaning "to recollect" or "to retrieve." For purposes of simplicity, I will use the term "recovery"
to refer to the practices of both Dewey and Heidegger.
3Fora summary of the "subjective" factors which lead Dewey to
'adopt Hegelianism, see his "From Absolutism to Experimentalism," in The Philosophy ofJohn Dewey, ed. John J. McDermott
(Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1981), 7. For a detailed account of Dewey's relationship with Hegelianism, see Robert
Westbrook, John Dewey andAmericanDemocracy (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1992), Chapters 1-3.
4For a discussion of Heidegger's intellectual development, especially his relationship with Husserl, see Thomas Sheehan,
"Heidegger's Early Years: Fragments for a Philosophical Biography," in Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker, ed. Thomas J.
Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, Inc., 1981),3-19.
SWhen he was a young student, Heidegger was given a copy of
Brentano's On the Manifold Meaning ofBeing Since Aristotle. This
book caused the young Heidegger to ask the question: "If being is
predicated in manifold meanings, then what is its leading fundamental meaning? What does Being mean?" (Martin Heidegger,
"My Way to Phenomenology," in On Time and Being, trans. Joan
Stambaugh (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 74.

6S ee Being and Time, 58.
7John Dewey, Experience and Nature (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), 37.

"Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. John Macquarrie and
Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), 44.
'Robert C. Pollock, "Process and Experience," in John Dewey:
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His Thought and Influence, ed. John Blewett, SJ. (New York:
Fordham University Press, 1960), 180.
lOSee Heidegger, Being and Time, Division One, Chapter II, Section 13 entitled "A founded mode in which Being-In is exemplified. Knowing the world." Heidegger states: "... knowing is a kind
of Being that belongs to Being-in-the-world (88). See also (409)
where Heidegger states that "theoretical research is not without a
praxis of its own." For Heidegger, "Readiness-to-hand is the way
in which entities as they are 'in themselves' are defined ontologicocategorically"(101). According to Dewey, "The assumption ofintellectualism' goes contrary to the facts of what is primarily experienced. For things are objects to be treated, used, acted upon and
with, enjoyed and endured, even more than things to be known.
They are things had before they are things cognized" (Experience
and Nature, 21).
IlS eeBeing and Time, 71-72.

12Heidegger uses the term "Da-Sein", which literally translated
means "there-being" and is the German word for "existence", to
communicate the primordial relationship between humans and
Being. Da-Sein, qua ex-istence, reaches out (ex) toward beings
(Sum, es, est ...). This etymology of the word "existence" can assist one in understanding Heidegger's conception of humans as
"ec-static" or outwardly directed toward the world. Dewey appropriated the Jamesian conception of experience as "double barreled"
in order to stress the continuity between human beings and their
world: "[Experience] is 'double-barreled' in that it recognizes in
its primary integrity no division between act and material, subject
and object, but contains them both in an unanalyzed totality" (Experience and Nature, 8.)
13See Being and Time (88) where Heidegger describes Dasein as
"fascinated" by the world. Also Heidegger relates this fascination,
or astonishment, to pathos. "But pathos is connected to paschein ,
to suffer, endure, undergo...:'(What is Philosophy? [New Haven:
College and University Press, 1955J, 81-83). For Dewey, man is
not "contemplatively detached." He is "a desiring, striving, think-
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ing, feeling creature.... Interest, thinking, planning, striving, consummation, and frustration are a drama enacted by these forces
and conditions " (Experience andNature, 76).
4
1 For

Heidegger this illusion of disinterestedness is a result of a
severe narrowing of interest: "Every science is constituted primarily by thematizing. That which is familiar prescientifically in
Dasein as disclosed Being-in-the-world, gets projected upon the
being which is specific to it. With this projection, the realm of entities is bounded off. The ways of access to them get 'managed'
methodologically." For Dewey, all human encounter is characterized by interest as well: "In this primitive condition of spontaneous impulsive activity, we have the basis for natural interest. ... we
are always interested in one direction rather than another. The condition of total lack of interest, or of absolutely impartially directed
interest, is as mythical as the story of the ass in scholastic ethics"
("Interest in Relation to Training of the Will," in The Philosophy

ofJohn Dewey, 430.)
lSSee Being and Time, 98ff. Dewey also attempts to uncover the
pragmaticLebenswelt of work: "The first thinker who proclaimed

that every event is effect of something and cause of something
else, that every particular existence is both conditioned and condition, merely put into words the procedure of the workman, converting a mode of practice into a formula.... Industrial arts are the
type-forms of experience that bring to light the sequential connections of things with one another" (Experience and Nature, 84-85).
"Dewey, "The Reflex Arc Concept in Psychology," in The Phi-

losophyofJohnDewey, 143.
17See Being and Time, 408, where Heidegger indicates the existential context of knowing " ... we are asking which of those conditions implied in Dasein's state of Being are existentially necessary for the possibility of Dasein existing in the way of scientific
research." Dewey continuously champions the importance of context: " ... neglect of contest is the greatest single disaster which
philosophical thinking can incur" ("Context and Thought," in On

Experience, Nature, and Freedom, 98).
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"Being and Time, 89.
"The failure of the Cartesian project of pure thought is treated by
Karsten Harries in "Descartes, Perspective, and the Angelic Eye,"
(Yale French Studies, no. 49, 1973). Harries states: "The Cartesian
demand for fully adequate representations of reality cannot be fulfilled. [It is] a move to the increasingly formal and therefore empty"
(38-39).
200ewey,"The Pattern of Inquiry," in The Philosophy of John
Dewey, 224. See also Experience andNature, where Dewey states:
"Whatever influences the changes of other things is itself changed .
The idea of an activity moving in one direction ... is a survival
from Greek physics. It has been banished from science, but remains to haunt philosophy" (Experience and Nature, 73-74). For
Heidegger, the contextual nature of knowing is expressed through
his notion of "facticity." "The concept of 'facticity' implies that an
entity 'within the world' has Being-in-the-world in such a way that
it can understand itself as bound up in its destiny with the being of
those entities which it encounters in the world" (Being and TIme,

82).
21According to Dewey: "Inquiry is the controlled or directed transformation of an indeterminate situation into one that is so determinate in its constituent distinctions and relations as to convert the
elements of the original situation into a unified whole" ("The Pattern of Inquiry", 226).
22Heidegger, ''The Origin of the Work of Art," in Philosophies of
Art and Beauty, ed. Albert Hofstadter and Richard Kuhns (New
York: The Modem library, 1964), 684. For Dewey, inquiry promotes the conversion "into a unified whole."
23Dewey, "Context and Thought;' in On Experience, Nature, and
Freedom, ed. Richard M. Bernstein (New York: Bobbs Merrill,
1960),107. The term "projection" is used much more by Heidegger
than Dewey. Perhaps Dewey's term "hypothesis" could be substituted for Heidegger's "projection." Heidegger states the role of
projection in the articulation of possibilities in the following: "...
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projection ... throws before itself the possibility as possibility and
lets it be as such" (Being and Time, 185).

"Being and Time, 30-31.
25Dewey, Experience and Nature, 53-54.
26Heidegger, "The Age of the World Picture," in The Question
Concerning Technology and Other Essays, trans. William Lovitt
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 115.
27Dewey does imply in "Towards a New Individualism" that man
is not in complete control of the forces of technology: " ... control
of power through the machine is not control of the machine itself.... We are not even approaching a climax of control; we are
hardly at its feeblest beginnings.... We have hardly commenced to
dream of managing physical power for the sake of projected purposes and prospective goods" ("Toward a New Individualism," in
The Philosophy ofJohn Dewey, 617). However, part of Dewey's
program, or "dream", is to effect such control: "A new individualism can be achieved only through the controlled use of all the resources of the science and technology that have mastered the physical forces of nature .... There is of course an extrinsic limit of science. But that limitation lies in the ineptitude of those who put it to
use; its removal lies in the rectification of its use, not in abuse of
the thing used." (Ibid., 617-619).
ZSDewey's dream-like optimism is conveyed through the following selections from "Renascent Liberalism," in The Philosophyof

John Dewey:
''The method of democracy-inasfar as it is that of organized intelligence-is to bring these conflicts out into the open
where their special claims can be seen and appraised, where they
can be discussed and judged in the light of more inclusive interests
than are represented by either of them separately" (657).
"But [coercion and oppression on a large scale] are not the
product of science and technology but of the perpetuation of old

54

GEIST

institutions and patterns untouched by scientific method" (659).
" ... history [is a] process of change [that] generates change
not only in details but also in the method of directing social change"
(659).
29Jfeidegger, "'Only a God Can Save Us''': The Spiegel Interview
(1966) in Heidegger: The Man and The Thinker, 55-56.
"Heidegger, "'Only a God Can Save Us'," 57.
31See Heidegger, '''Only a God Can Save us"', 59. Obviously
Heidegger was not referring to Dewey specifically; but if 'biology' had been added to Heidegger's statement, perhaps this statement could be indirectly relevant to Dewey's appeal for a "local"
as opposed to a "general" solution-against science "writ[ten] with
a capital S."

32Experience and Nature, 388.
33Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," in TheQuestion Concerning Technology and OtherEssays, ed. William Lovitt
(New York: Harper and Row, 1977), 34-35.
34 Nietzsche, The Birth a/Tragedy in TheBirth a/Tragedy and The
Casea/Wagner, ed. Walter Kaufmann (Vintage Books, 1967), 98.

Dangerous Encounters:
The Other, the I, and Sociality
Carlos Sanchez
San Jose State University
"And. because the conditoin ofman is a condition ofwar ofeveryone against everyone...it followeth that in such a condition every
man has a right to everything.... And therefore, as long as this
natural right endureth, there can be no security to any man of living out the time which nature ordinarily alloweth man to live."
-Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan
"...somewhere in the lumber room ofour habitual knowledge, all
ofus have apractical idea ofman, ofwhat his general possibilities
for behavior are."
-Jose Ortega y Gasset
Recent events have prompted the writing of this essay.
Among them is the continual violence permeating in the backstreets
of our cities, in our schools, and abroad, infiltrating families, and
destroying lives-young lives and old lives alike. As a participating member of society, I feel it is my duty to speak about the reality which is rarely discussed philosophically; a violent reality which
underlines our social relations, and indeed, our whole social structure-and which has not been given the importance which it deserves in societal discussion.
What do I mean when I speak of a "violent reality"? By a
violent reality, I am contending that our social relations are fundamentally, and essentially dangerous; dangerous because we do not,
and cannot, understand the inherent potential of those around us,
and this leads to the danger of misunderstanding our relationship
to others, who could at any given moment surprise us with a violent act, or amaze us with an act of kindness. However, more frequently than not, we are forced to reflect on the underlying foundations of our social relations with others only after we are
"shocked" by another person's violent act. Why the surprise? We
ask ourselves. Why didn't I see this coming?
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I.
Before I continue, let me say some initial words on the importance
on reflecting on violence within our social circles . Violence comes
about in many different forms among many different beings. We
are used to seeing animals engage in violence, because they either
feel threatened, or because they are naturally aggressive . We are
also used to violence as portrayed and discussed by the media, in
the form of conflict and resolution between characters whose behavior is predictable. We rarely ask ourselves why two beings, as
such, need to be, and are, hostile to one another-this is all given
to us in the form of character exposition and plot development. It
is not until another being is aggressive toward us that we begin to
question the nature of violence, whether it is an animal or another
human person who is exhibiting the aggressive behavior. When
the violent behavior is expressed by another person, we tend to
become surprised, and incredulous. We didn 't expect this! we usually exclaim. We cannot allow ourselves to believe that such and
such a person attacked us for no particular reason at all. Following
a confrontation, our reaction could take one of two forms; we could
either resign ourselves to our own fear and flee or surrender, which
could possibly lead to tragic and regrettable consequences, or we
could reciprocate the aggressive behavior with further violence.
Both of these routes, as we can see, have undesirable outcomes.
They will inevitably lead to further violence.
So what are we to do? How do we approach this problem?
It is highly unlikely that we will ever succeed in supressing our
own violent natures, and it appears absurd to say that we (as a
society, as a culture) can repress the violent nature of other persons. The only option is to reflect on the nature of violence, and
on the notion that our social ties to others are founded on the assumption that the Other is danger simply because he is capable of
any act, thought, or deed. Only then can we begin to accept the
violent reality of which we are part of; and only then, can we, as a
society, attempt to approach the problems brought about by this
misunderstanding, in a different way, with a different mind set,
one that takes into consideration the potential of the Other, and
hence open the way for the establishment of a radically different
humane diplomacy.
In this paper, I will not engage in outlining a humane di-
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plomacy, nor will I attempt to offer cultural criticisms, my intention will be to conduct a preliminary investigation into the notion
of intersubjectivity, with an attempt to show that the Other is to be
taken as fundamentally dangerous.

II.
The notion of intersubjeetivity comes into play when we endeavor
to speak of any form of sociality. Therefore, I will approach the
problem which I outlined above from a phenomenological perspective, considering Jose Ortega y Gasset's notion of societal interactions as he presents them in a chapter of his book, Man andPeople,
entitled, "The Other as Danger, and the I as Surprise.'"
Borrowing from HusserI, Ortega y Gasset's theory of
intersubjectivity attempts to solve the age-old problem of accounting for the Other 's presence in the horizon of our sphere of owness,
The Other, for Ortega y Gasset appears to us first as a not-I, who
we can know only through his external gestures and reactions to
the world of objects (similar to Husserl 's notion of appresentation).
However, he sees this as problematic when we make a statement
such as, "I know that person." Ortega y Gasset believes that all I
- know about the Other is his outward appearance-his gesticulations, his reactions, his gestures; I do not, and cannot, imagine, as
HusserI wants us to do, what the Other's intentions are, that he has
an ego like mine, etc . The Other presents himself to me as a dangerous, "perilous" not-I, who has the potential to do what I least
expect, for the sole reason that I cannot "know" him.
But, you might ask, How is the idea that the Other as fundamentally dangerous related to our modem state of affairs? Why
not begin with the notion that the Other is a " friend"?
Well, to answer the latter question first and then moving
towards the former: HusserI's notion of analogical apperception,
for example, fails to take into account that I observe merely the
exteriority of the Other's body, whereas I experience my own body
from within. HusserI tries to grasp the Other as an alter ego by an
analogical projection from my body to the Other 's body. The
Other's worId will always remain strange to me. How could transference by empathy be possible if I am a male and the Other a
female, for example. To Ortega, the ego is some things that I alone
am, in my radical solitude. The Other's radical reality remains as
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inaccessible to me as mine is to him. I cannot see the Other as an
alter ego who believes what I believe, or appreciates what 1 appreciate. With this in mind, it makes little sense to perceive the Other
as essentially friendly or as a friend incapable of certain acts. This
would lead us to hold a naive picture of humanity where we held
no appreciation for the potentiality of the individual person. If human potential, in its grandeur and in its horror, is not taken into
consideration in terms of the social project, atrocities such as the
ones we are currently witnessing in the cities of America, as well
as in the backyards of Europe, will continue to occur. The Other is
danger precisely because he is unknown human potential.
The question arises: How are we to approach the Other,
especially in a time like ours, where approaching the Other could
possibly cause serious harm to our own selves?
For Ortega y Gasset this is a matter of how we perceive
the Other. Only after the Other appears to us in our horizon, can
we approach the Other. Ortega y Gasset's theory of intersubjectivity
runs as follows: I am radically alone in my own primordial world,
in my particular world, in its radical reality which is patent to me,
intimate to me, a reality which represses me and shelters me. (141)
My world is made up of things whose being consists in beingfor
me, they either serve me or hinder me. From my solitude, I encounter the Other. I understand immediately that that Other is not a
thingfor me, but a being who posses a horizon of possibilities like
mine, and who is an Other with his own peculiar reality, etc. The
characteristic and primary attribute of what I call the Other Man is
that he responds, actually or potentially, to my action upon him,
which obliges my action to reckon in advance with his reaction.
This co-respondence between the Other and I is what Ortega y
Gasset refers to as inter-action. "My action, then, is social, in this
sense of the word, when in it I reckon with the eventual reciprocity
of the Other," he writes (139). Consequently, "He who is incapable of reciprocating, whether favorably or adversely, is not a
human being."(140) Hence, an essential feature of a human being, of the Other, is that he responds to me, in either a positive way,
or in a negative way; in a peaceful manner, or in a violent manner.
So, I approach the essential stranger fully aware of his
potential, which is something that I could never truly conceive of.
If the Other reciprocates to my actions, as I approach him, than a
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We is formed. The relation We is the primary form of social relation, its content does not matter, it can be a kiss or a blow. The We
is defined by intercourse between the I and the You-the You appears after the We relationship becomes an intimate one. When
my intercourse with the Other is intimate, he is an individual who
becomes unique; and since this happens to me not only with one
but with a number of other individuals, I find the human World
appearing to me as a horizon of individuals who are You's; that is,
of those individuals who for me are unique; the farther I get from
the center, the more indistinguishable men become (148), the more
threatening, hence the more violent they appear.

III.
Thus, even through a violent act can the I and the Other
become a We. The question still remains, Why must I perceive the
Other as danger? As I have already stated, I know nothing about
the Other except that he is my like from his corporal appearanceI know that the Other collides with me, negates me, struggles with
me. I don't know how he feels, or what he feels. I am completely
ignorant of such a being. Hence, I need to intervene. I must try to
anticipate the action or reaction of the Other. I know that the other
will probably react to my action, but I do not know how. As Ortega
y Gasset puts it, "In the presence of the pure and unknown Other, I
have to expect the worst.. .." (151)
Let us consider an example. While walking to a comer
liquor store on Saturday night, I notice that a man is standing on
the comer, leaning against a telephone booth. He is clean shaven
and neatly dressed. He smokes a cigarette and appears to be lost in
thought. As I come nearer I notice that he wears glasses and a
paperback book is tucked in his right jacket pocket. A car passes
by and with the aid the glow of the car lights I notice that the book
is actually a collection of poems by Robert Frost. If I assume,
from what I notice about the tall lanky man, that he is simply an
average citizen enjoying the night, maybe waiting for a call, contemplating Frost while he does this, and that he therefore could not
possibly pose any threat to my person, I am, through this judgment, not considering his capacities, his potential, from what I
observe about him. If I assume this, I could be in for a surprise. I
need not assume anything, except that this is a man whom I know
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nothing about, but that he is standing in front of me, with a poetry
book in his jacket, smoking a cigarette. This man represent, at that
moment, countless possibilities, and hence poses a danger to me
by that very idea. If I decide to approach the individual, I cannot
neglect the possibility that he might pose a threat to my life, nor
can I neglect the possibility that he might be waiting for a stranger
to pass along that might ask him about Frost. By approaching the
Other in this fashion I have eliminated the prejudicial notions that
might lead to a violent encounter with him. Of course, he could
still tum around and swing at me, but I had expected this reaction
from the beginning, so I can quickly think of alternatives.

IV.
In retrospect, I concur with Ortega y Gasset's postulation that the
Other should be perceived as fundamentally perilous. The Other
as danger is a concept that could possibly lead us to re-think the
way in which we approach the Other as a being in the world. A
naive conception of the Other as an ego essentially "like" my ego,
closes off the possibilities of what the Other might truly be in his
genuine radical solitude: certainly a being completely different than
I, and hence incompatible with whatever expectations I could have
of him. On the other hand, viewing the Other as danger, I must
understand the difference in our spheres of owness, and hence I am
forced to consider approaches that might be compatible with the
potentialities that the Other represents. In this way I am also compelled to divide my social relations between those with friends,
whom I have somehow become intimate with, and enemies, those
distanced from the center of my primordial sphere, and which I
know nothing about except that they represent a totality of human
potential.

V.
A final word. I always have to anticipate the possibility of violence. I have no choice but to initiate my intercourse with the
Other with a wary approach. A continual intercourse will reveal
the limits of possibilities, and the impossibilities, and slowly the
perilous nature of the Other will vanish. Modem society emphasizes the inter-action of people in a restricted sense. However, the
presupposition that somehow we are all essentially social beings
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brings with it the idea that we must suppress some part of ourselves-the violent self, our potential self. Simply stated, this means
that modem society's view on the individual, by not crediting him/
her with the potentiality that he/her represents, does not consider
our violent capabilities. That we are all social beings posits the
view that we all want to be productive members of society, and
disallows for the view that I am expounding here, that we are essentially dangerous beings. Once we come to grasp this "dangerous" notion, social programs aimed at improving inter-relations
among people will need to be revamped and re-thought.

• Ortega y Gasset, Jose. Man andPeople. Trans. Willard R. Trask.
New York: W.W. Norton & Company. 1957. All quotes are taken
from the chapter "The Other as Danger and The I as Surprise," pp.
139-170.
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SJSU SYMPOSIUM

The Unequal World of Power and Justice
Tony Nguyen
Graduate Student, San Jose State University
"Friends, there are no friends!" the dying sage shouted.
- Aristotle
The debate between Thrasymachus and Socrates, in Book
I of the Republic, is a debate between the power philosopher and
the philosopher-king. Thrasymachus divides the world among
power lines, and states that power makes people unequal. He defines Justice as:
nothing other than the advantage of the strong
(338c) ...Each makes laws to its own advantage.
Democracy makes democratic laws; tyranny
makes tyrannical laws, and so on with the others.
And they declare what they have made - what is
to their own advantage - to be just for their subjects , and they punish anyone who goes against
this as unjust. This, then, is what I say justice is,
the same in all cities, the advantage of the established rule (339a).
The strong rule because they have the power. The weak serve
because they have no recourse. Tom between the strong and the
weak, we ask, "What is justice? What is just rule?"
.
The opening scene of Book I, Socrates and his friend
Glaucon meet Polemarchus in open confrontation, on the streets.
This confrontation shows the strong and weak, and anticipates issues in the main debate. Confrontations arise when interests conflict. Polemarchus wants Socrates and his companion Glaucon to
spend the night in the city of Piraeus. Socrates wants to go home.
Given different aims, how do conflicts resolve? As the strong man
war chief, Polemarchus brandishes his army and asks "see how
many we are? (327c) ." He believes that his numbers are sufficient
to force Socrates into compliance. Socrates is portrayed as the
weak. Not only is he old, but he lacks the numbers to outfight
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Polemarchus. Nihilistically, nothing stops Polemarchus from pummeling Socrates into submission. Some might enjoy that. He,
though, is not one to harm friends. Instead of force he offers "a
spectacle, wine, boys and talk." This wins Glaucon and both he
and Socrates follow Polemarchus.
This scene shows that here the strong and the weak are
friends. Power does not work in a vacuum. Instead, it exists within
human relationships. One cannot overpower a friend the way one
would an enemy. Violence destroys the friendship . Because of
friendship, Polemarchus' army proves ineffective in forcing
Socrates to comply. Besides being friends, the strong and the weak
can be enemies to one another. Seeing and knowing the difference
between friends and foe is intrinsic in the education of the philosopher-king, and is heavily developed in later books of the Republic.
For our purposes it is important to know that friendly relationships
differ radically from hostile relationships. Keep this distinction in
mind while reading the exchange between the power-philosopher
and the philosopher-king. Besides being friends, the opening scene
introduces the strong as the many and the weak as the few. Within
friendly circles, one gains compliance not through coercion, but
through persuasion. Persuasion proves very important in the power
philosopher and philosopher-king debate. In debate , the world is
shaped through discourse or logos. If Polemarchus were the powerphilosopher and not the war chief, then his 'strength of numbers'
would be the majority opinion. Is majority opinion sufficient to
establish it as the stronger logos then that of the few or the knowledgeable?
Thrasymachus states that the few exerting sufficient power
can impose their ideas of the right and the true upon the many.
Power cannot be understood as sheer physical power. For example,
the Pancratist' can beat people with their fists, but they are not
rulers. Their brawn is not powerful enough to command obedience from the whole polis. Might here, is the might of the rulers.
It is the power to create laws, declare what is just and to punish
transgressors. In this scheme, justice is not a virtue, but a power
that decrees, self-justifies, and preserves its grounds by eliminating opposing world-views.
In contrast to the power-philosopher, the philosopher-king
grounds justice not in power, but in knowledge. To establish this
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position, Socrates must expose the inherit contradiction of
Thrasymachus' of this view. With power insufficient to ensure
justice, Socrates then grounds just rule in the ability of the ruler to
know what is best for his subjects. Knowing what is best means
knowing the truth about justice. By basing knowledge on truth,
Socrates creates a possible objective notion of Justice.
Does truth ground justice? Though the creation of truth is
not a concern for either Thrasymachus or Socrates, one can ask,
can power create truths? Does Socrates assume that Truth is a
precondition for knowledge and that this is "truth" has independent existence? Following the power-philosopher's reasoning one
finds that if (i) knowledge is power, and (ii) might is right, then
those who have knowledge have both might and right on their sides.
As the intellectual power establishment, the 'knowers' create the
logos necessary to make knowledge public and intelligible. They
manage the vocabulary, control the schools and choose the books
to define the fields of knowledge. For example, the language of
the 'wine buffs', analyze the shapeless taste of wine into "rounded",
"smooth" or "full-bodied". One drinks wine differently to access
these hidden qualities. To separate the 'palate' from the 'finish'
one must hold the wine in your mouth and roll back your tongue.
The special language and practices create a mutually supporting
society of 'wine-experts' able to different otherwise homogenous
tasting wine. Their logos excludes other descriptions of wine as
legitimate expressions (i.e. religious uses of ceremonial wine). If
power creates truths, then by grounding justice in truth, Socrates
only delays the 'truth' that justice is power. However if power
cannot create truth, thenjustice is something other than power based.
Because we are beings-in-the-world, the world in many instances
acts indifferently to our best intentions. One way to show the limits of power is by show the consequence of power exercised-inthe-world. While theories mayor may not cohere, the veracity of
thought should fit world conditions. One truth of being-in-theworld is that people make mistakes.
If power creates truth, then can rulers err? If they can,
then rulers cannot create truth. Socrates asks "are rulers in all cities infallible, or are they liable to error (339c)?" Thrasymachus
answers, "In giving orders, rulers are sometimes in error as to what
is best for themselves, yet it is still just for the subject to obey
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(339d). " If a ruler errs to his disadvantage, and the subjects obey
the bad order, then the ruler is disadvantaged. By stating that justice is defined by the rulers to promote their advantage, and maintaining that it is always just to obey rulers, Thrasymachus contradicts when rulers make mistakes and subjects perpetuate that mistake. In this situation, justice is both for the advantage and to disadvantage of the ruler. To clear this contradiction and save
Thrasymachus' thesis, we can pursue three strategies: (i) drop the
condition that requires the subject to obey blindly, (ii) change the
definition of 'advantage' or (iii) redefine 'ruler'.
Personally, I prefer the first strategy. Though the single
subject is weak, as a group the subjects make the overwhelming
majority. Being the many,we should spend some time talking about
them. Oddly, the subject of ' the subject' is silent in the Republic.
The attention is focused on the ruler and their education. What can
we make of the character of the ideal subject? From the Symposium, the contrast between the oppressed and free subject is clear.
Tyranny dwells between the oppression of the ruler and the servile
compliance of the ruled. The tyrant is the ruler who does not allow
his people to indulge in high thinking or in staunch fellowship and
friendship (Symp. 182b). Because he fears his people, the tyrant
requires them to be absolutely obedient. He cannot grant them the
freedom to defy orders, because he does not trust his subjects to
act in his best interests. His distrust forces him to prevent his subjects from gathering and talking - else they would plot to overthrow his power! He cannot rely on his people to protect him from
his own mistakes. With this type of work relationship, the tyrant
must maintain that it is just for subjects to obey. In the ideal world,
the ruler must be able to rely on his people. To do this, I reject the
assumption that it is just for the subject to obey the orders of the
rulers - always. Given the freedom to disobey, the good subject
will help the ruler. The Socratic subject is "anyone who is prepared to devote himself to the service of another, in the belief that
through him will find increase wisdom or some other virtue, we
hold that such willing servitude is neither base nor abject (Symp.
183c)." The good ruler inspires loyalty because his subjects are
"touched by moral beauties and [thus] is constant all of his life
(Symp. 183c)." If Thrasymachusdemands obedience from his
people, then Socrates inspires loyalty. Loyalty backed with firm
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intelligence makes the ideal subject.
Instead of reaching this conclusion, the dialogue travels
different paths. Cleitophon, a young man listening to the debate,
answers for Thrasymachus. He wants to change 'advantage' to
mean what the stronger 'believes to be his advantage' whether it is
truly advantageous or not (340b). To accept the change one collapses the distinction between reality and appearance. If truth is
what the ruler creates, then what appearances of truth the ruler
creates must be really true. By denying all standards, except those
sanctioned by the ruler, the ruler can exempt himself from those
standards. This way, the ruler escapes all criticism. Socrates asks
Tbrasymachus ifhe accepts this revision. Does Thrasymachus mean
that the advantage is what seems to be the advantage and not what
is the advantage? Thrasymachus refuses this maneuver. He asks
ironically, "Do you think I'd call someone who is in error stronger
at the moment he errs (34Oc)?" Thrasymachus recognizes mistakes. As a being-in-the-world, he cannot escape the consequences
of his own actions. To act incorrectly is to err. To make a mistake
means to go against intentions and create harm to ones self. For
the self-interested ruler, he must act according to what lli truly his
advantage and not on what only ~ to be advantageous. Acting true to his words, Thrasymachus rejects the apparent advantage Cleitophon offers.
Instead he pursues a course that really is to his advantage.
He asks, "When someone makes an error in the treatment of patients, do you call him a doctor in regards to that very error? Or
when someone makes a error in accounting, do you call him an
accountant in regards to that very error in calculation (340d)?" In
other words, would a doctor act like a true doctor if he fails his
practice? The answer is no. "No craftsman ever errs. Its' when
his knowledge fails him that he makes an error, and in regards to
that error he is no craftsman. A ruler insofar as he is ruler, never
makes errors and unerringly decrees what is best for himself, and
this his subject must do (341a)." Thrasymachus wants to preserve
the absolute power of the ruler. What undermine the ruler is not
his power, but his mistakes. To solve this problem, all we need is
the perfect ruler. This move is subtle. By speaking of the perfect
ruler, this' ruler' now is the rulerqua ruler or the ruler as he should
be, if he were to epitomize ruling. By debating on the ideal ruler
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and they also debate on the ideal form of rule. To verify this switch,
Socrates asks whether the sense of ruler used is "in the ordinary
sense or in the precise sense (341b)." Thrasymachus says the precise.
If a perfect ruler can exist, then it follows that there must
be a perfect way to rule. With perfection in sight two consequences
develop - the possibility for knowledge and standards . First, possessing that perfected vision means having knowledge or episteme.
All understanding short of that knowledge is mere doxa or belief.
This distinction between episteme and doxa gets developed in the
central books of the Republic, during the middle stages the philosopher-king's education. The distinction opens grounds towards
establishing truth as logos of that perfection or possibility of making truth independent from human beliefs. Secondly, By speaking
of a perfect rule it becomes possible to establish objective standards and disciplines or arts, which strive towards knowing that
standard.
Given that objective truths exists, this does not exclude
the possibility that it is the artist and not the art which determines
the perfection of that truth. To answer this concern we should understand art. An art or a craft is a human endeavor, which seeks
the perfection of its art object. Arts are defined by its object and by
the methods towards that object. Shoe making has shoes as its
object and the techniques of making shoes as its methods. Biology
has life forms and physics the physical world as their objects, and
the experiments and theory formation as its methods in trying to
study these objects. Arts without objects are not arts at all. Different arts have different objects if they are independent arts. To understand an art, one must understand the art, artist, object and the
relationship to one another. We can understand this interrelationship through metaphor and myth. In the next exchanges, Socrates
and Thrasymachus present different metaphors for understanding
the art of ruling.
While Socrates' models gives priority to the arts,
Thrasymachus' favors the artist. First, Socrates says that ruling is
like doctoring. The ruler must preserve the health of the social
body. He does so by preventing sickness, and removing it once it
occurs. Here the ruler is the social surgeon. We encounter this
metaphor in our daily life. Crime and poverty are called 'social
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diseases '. We constantly seek ' cures' for our conditions. We require the government to ' remove' unwanted elements from our
streets. As a surgeon, the ruler cannot indiscriminately remove
organs and institutions. He must know what to cut, and what tools
to use. Removing healthy elements is harmful; as is amputation,
when a small slit will suffice. Next Socrates compares the ruler to
a ship captain. Besides maintaining the health of the body politics,
the ruler must lead his people. In this capacity, the body politics is
very much a 'ship of state' and ruler the captain. This metaphor is
important first because the captain knows how to sail. As a sailor
himself, he is part of the group that he leads . He is not an alienated
ruler, or an outsider. Also, his knowledge of ruling sailors marks
him as being different than the mere sailors. By being part of the
group, he should not use the sailors for selfish benefit, but to the
benefit of everyone on the ship of state. In both instances , the art
as art, serves not as the tool for the artisan, but exists to service the
object of the art. Medicine serves the sick, while captaining serves
the sailors. With a single stroke, Socrates inverts Thrasymachus'
thesis. Instead of the weak serving the strong, if the strong practiced the art of ruling, the strong serves the weak.
To defend his position, Thrasymachus invokes different
metaphors. Instead of doctoring or steering society, the ruler actually is the herdsman and the shepherd. People are herd animals
who need a strong leader to tell them what to do. By subsuming
yourself by the constraints the herd constrains themselves the herdsman becomes no better then the herd, stupid animals who cannot
think independently. Besides stupidity, people are ruled by fear.
Fear turns people into sheep. Meekness and mildness are thin disguises for weakness. The strong have no need to flock. The strong
who are smart become shepherds. Shepherds to not tend flock for
the flock's benefit. They do so, so that they can eat the sheep and
use their wool.
Unlike Socrates, Thrasymachus does not argue that the just
ruler is one who serves his people. Instead he argues that this man
is a fool- "a just man, always gets less than an unjust one in partnerships ... in matters relating to the city, those that follow the rules
pay more taxes and receive smaller refunds. Finally, in public
matters the just man loses his private life and gains no advantage,
because he does not rob the public purse (343d)." Instead of speak-
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ing of the art, Thrasymachus places priority on the artist. This
time he speaks in the ordinary sense . In his original definition, the
ruler is constrained by error. To rectify this, he creates the definition of ruler qua ruler. For Socrates, the ideal ruler knows the
ruling craft and thus cannot make errors. In contrast, the
Thrasymachus' ruler is infallible because he is infallible. He possesses talents and strengths that free from the constraints of 'truth'
and 'justice' which bind the herd and flock. This conception holds
that power "is stronger, freer and more masterly than justice (344c)."
Not only is the world unequal, but injustice is the norm! Only a
fool subsumes himself under the art.
With so may fine points arrayed against him, the philosopher-king reigns in the power-philosopher. In the initial confrontation between Socrates and Polemarchus the conflict between the
strong and the weak, the many and the few is a conflict between
friends. The philosopher-king spends a large part of his education
as learning to distinguish the difference between friends and enemies. This power-dynamics reenters the debate as Socrates compares the society of friends to the society of foes . Socrates asserts
that not only is justice stronger than power, but that justice is good.
First "injustice has the power to make whatever arises in it incapable of achieving as a unit. Second, it makes the unit an enemy of
itself (352a)." At the individual level, injustice makes "one not of
one mind" and makes enemies of just people (352a). The enemy is
schizophrenic and so is the society of enemies. We see this disintegrated will in Thrasymachus. He demands absolute obedience
from his subjects and yet, absolute freedom for himself. In a society of full of Thrasymachus', the tensions created from the will to
absolute obedience and freedom create irreconcilable conflicts. The
tyrant must insist that he is right, by force of might. Furthermore,
the tyrant demands obedience because he cannot stand to reason
with people. A ruler of oppressed, ignorant subjects, the tyrant
fears that his people will riot or tum against him. He also fears that
his smarter minions will tire of servitude, and try to usurp his unique
position of freedom. With so much strife, enemies are incapable
of accomplishing anything at all. Friends, on the other hand, trust
friends. Friends can put aside personal preferences and work towards a common good. Friends can bind together to form a whole
much greater than the sum of their parts. Friendships require just
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actions from not only themselves but from others. A society of
friends through joint effort can overcome a society of enemies. To
maintain the polis of friends requires justice.
What is Justice amongst a polis or body of friends? For
Socrates, Justice is not power, but an excellence. Everything has
its excellences or virtues. Things reveal their virtues through their
acts and functions. Excellences are the best possible qualities, or
the best possible states. If ones natural talents and inclinations are
promoted and perfected to the highest degree, one is happy. If
happiness is being in harmony with excellences, then people are
happier being in a society which recognizes their excellences, then
in one where they are repressed and denied. To develop an excellent society, not only must the individual talents be nurtured, but
that there must be ways of weave this talented people together in
an efficient and harmonious way. As an excellence Justice is possible in both the individual and the polis.
Book I of the Republic seek to establish a concept of Justice based on virtues derived from ideas of friendship. To prove
that Justice is a virtue and not a power. If power creates justice,
then it can also create truth. To defeat this thesis Socrates establishes that truth is objective and not constructed. He does this by
pointing out to the fact that people make mistakes. If people do
make mistakes then there is a right and wrong way to do things.
Right conduct means acting with reason and truth. To eradicate
the distinction between right and wrong means eradicating the distinction between reality and appearance. This move is untenable,
so Truth as perfection becomes possible. With perfection a ground,
knowledge as having vision of perfection becomes possible. Crafts
capture the perfection or the virtues of its studied object. Though
a craftsman may seek to pervert the craft for his own use, for a
craftsman to act the craftsman, he must follow the guidelines of
his craft. To preserve the perfect polis, the ruling craft requires
that the ruler serve his people. If the ruler refuses his craft he
becomes the tyrant. The tyrant believes he has absolute power. In
truth he has little power, as he must constantly fight to retain his
hold on power. This drains him and makes it hard for him to fulfill
his agenda. If the tyrant makes enemies of his people, the philosopher-king makes them into friends. By serving friends he acts not
only within the virtues of his craft, but also he himself becomes
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virtuous.
"Enemies, there is no enemy!" shout I, the living fool.
- Nietzsche
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Examining Empathy:
Husserl, the Other, and Racial Difference
Tanya Rodriguez
Undergraduate Student, San Jose State University
In his analysis of the Other, Husserl argues that we naturally empathize and project onto the other a reflective life like our
own. He describes our experience of the other as 'two-fold.' We
encounter the material body and the lived body as a unified subject. Through empathy, the self recognizes the other. Empathy
differs fromsympathy. In empathy, oneloses oneself in the other,'
Accordingto Husserl, empathyenables the primordial responseto
the other. Weread into the signals sent by the other's body,identifying with their behavior. I wish to raise a question at this point.
In the presenceof someone who does not look or act like me, do I
still naturally project onto him or her, an inner life like my own? I
fear that historically humans have demonstrated difficulty empathizing with the racial other. I believe our capacity to communicate and live harmoniously depends on a conscious expansion of
our ability to empathize. Husserl provides a method for such an
expansion. In his analysis of motivation, he describes the activity
of fantasy. This reflective activity offers a way to identify with
racial others as ego-subjects. In this essay, I outline the encounter
with the other as object and subject as Husserl describesit in Ideas
II. Then, after applying Husserl's analysis to the racial other, I
argue that we must develop empathy further for moral progress.
Finally, I introduce Husserl's analysis of motivation as a tool for
empathic expansion.
Husserl argues that our originalexperiencegives us others
alongwith objectsand the environment. Weexperience other men
'two-fold.' In additionto the korper, or the body in the sense of an
anatomical subject, we experience the lieb, or psychic, animated
body. Others have subjective lives like our own. Therefore, we
have the potentialfor relationships and the ability to communicate
with eachother:"Given eo ipso with the act of apperceivingsomething as humanis also the possiblity of mutual relation, communicationbetween man and man."? By our most primitive experience
we apperceive and introject the reflective life of others. Through
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introjection, we know something of our own inner life by our interaction with the other. We put within ourselves what we see in
others. For example, we understand our backache through the
other's back. Quentin Lauer emphasizes that Husserl gives the
apperception of the other, body and soul, as primary: "The body is
given immediately as animated by a soul, and by the same token
the soul is immediately given in the same evidence."? Husserl
believes that the other is given in a single act original perception.
We at once perceive the material body and the inner psychic life of
others.
By naming the primitive sense that gives others to us "original perception.?' Husserl hopes to offer the object that is also
subject as more than a co-presentation. In other words, original
perception describes our experience of the other as a vibrant living
presence. Husser! sets up a continuum upon which the original or
"primal presence" is the most basic referent and the "co-presentation" or "appresence" reveals the former. Appresence is the
empathetic way the internal life of another is given. When I say
'the object that is also subject', I mean that the other is unique
from other objects in that he or she objectifies. As an intentional
creature like myself, the other focuses his or her attention on various objects of interest as I do. Others constitute the world around
them, as I would in their position. Indeed, we may understand the
other as another viewpoint in the world. We are all viewpoints,
intersections of intention and perception.
We share a common experience, first of" ...objects which
can be prim ally present not just to one subject, but, if they are
primally present to one, can be given identically as primally present
idealiter to all other subjects ... "5
Objects are given to us primally present because we interact with them through raw perception. It is within common space
and time that we live in the world and with each other. For Husserl,
the subjective life is only primally present to the subject. Our unique
subjective worlds come together in one objective world. While
this notion of a common shared world lends itself to the problem
of objectivity, Husserllimits himself here to the constitution of the

psycbe,"
Perception of other human beings gives us their corporeal
body first. We know that they have an interior life because they
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are animate. Their physical behavior indexes their inner nature. I
project onto them a reflective like my own, because 1identify with
their behavior. Husserl states: "I apprehend them as Bodies, that
is, I feel empathy that in them there is an Ego-subject."?
However, someone may easily object with Husserl's argument for natural empathy. How could Husserl explain racial difference in the other? If the other does not look like me or act like
me, do I still naturally project onto them thoughts, feelings, and
dreams like my own? If humans do have natural empathy for others regardless of race, why is racial difference such a source of
conflict? Husserl's answer to these questions resides in the primacy of apperception. The subjective life of the other presents
itself only in appresence and not in original perception. However,
Husser! argues the other is given as a unified subject: "It is only
with empathy and the constant orientation of empirical reflection
onto the psychic life which is appresented along with the other's
Body and which is continually taken Objectively, together with
the Body."8
Therefore, our experience of the psychic life weaves itself
with the original perception of the body. Yet, if racial difference in
the other prevents empathy, it must be a learned response. It is
learned in the way that Husserl describes: projection and introjection. Moral progress may depend on our expansion of empathy for
others whose bodies have a different original appearance. If our
experience of another's subjective life wraps itself with the original perception of the body, then racial differences could make it
more difficult to project onto the other reflective lives like our own.
Husser! takes up a similar issue with his analysis of motivation and self-understanding. We may conceive of something we
want, but upon reconsideration decide that we do not have any
desire for it. I can imagine wanting it or imagine a situation in
which I would want it: "The 'I could' means here that I put myself
into it in fantasy, hence carry out the neutrality modification of the
doxic and valuing acts, and find the relevant thesis of pleasure, of
desire, and of will to be compatible with their substratum." Fantasy gives us the capability of understanding desires and motivations we do not presently have. I can step outside myself and into
a fantasy. Husser! calls this fantasy life a quasi-life and points our
an inner contradiction. For example, I may consider some action
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and say to myself 'I could never do that'. However, I may say to
myself of the same action 'I could do that given certain circumstances, etc.'. Thus, we have a contradiction: 'I could do it' and 'I
could not do it'. Husser! explains: "I am lacking the original consciousness of being able to do this action or of having the power
for this action (which, even in the case of a fictional action, is an
originary, non-neutralized consciousness); this action contradicts
the kind of person I am, my way of letting myself be motivated.' 0
Pointing out that the Ego constitutes itself by an active positiontaking, Husser! drives the importance of fantasy for the "I am." I
settle on who "I am" through active judgements on what I could do
and what I could not do, what I value and I do not.
At this point, I want to recall my discussion of the racial
other. When we encounter the other, we read into their body a
reflective life. We identify with their behaviors and project onto
them thoughts and feelings like our own. Husser! describes this
reading of the body as system of signs:
Gradually, in this way, a system of indications is
formed, and there is finally in actuality an analogy between this system of signs 'expressing' psychic events, both the active and passive, and the
system of signs of language for the expression of
thoughts, abstracting from the fact that language
itself, as actuallyspoken, also belongs to the former
system.

In the case of the racial and cultural other we often find a system of
sign radically different from our own. I think that in abuses of
human rights based on racial difference, the abuser fails to read
into the body of the other a reflective life like his or her own. For
example, consider the history of slavery. Certain cultures enslaved
the racial other whose culture varied so much from their own that
they could not identify with them as other Ego-subjects.
Do we have a hope of overcoming a lack of empathy for
the racial other? The answer may reside in Husserl's analysis of
motivation: "Earlier I was motivated in this way, now in a different
way, and that is precidely bechause I have become an other in the
meantime."ll Here, Husserl refers to the other self that comes
with age. Could the same analysis enable us to understand the
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racial other? People have different motives for their actions. We
hear the racial other say 'You can't understand how I feel or where
I am coming from.' How are we to understand the motives of
people whose bodies and viewpoints differ radically from our own?
Husserl answers:
I do so as the one I am, by means of fantasizing
presentifications of possible situations, in which I
"reflect" on what kind of sensuous or spiritual
stimuli would affect me, what power they would
have, how I would therefore decide in such a case,
in which direction the pull would be greater, which
power would prevail, assuming the situation remains the same.
Active fantasy provides the opportunity to understand the other.
We have used fantasy for empathic purposes before. Consider the
Rawlsian 'Veil of Ignorance.' Rawls asks us to step outside ourselves, forget our own position in society, and assume the position
of the least fortunate. In so doing, we enable ourselves to make
just decisions . A similar practice for reading into the racial other a
reflective life like our own would provide a foundation for improved race relations. Every expression of the other provides a
signal or a sign of his or her interior life. Developing the ability to
fill in meaning for these signs would ease our relations with racial
others. We hear the racial other: 'You are not seeing us, you don't
seem to understand what we are feeling or thinking,' and we must
respond. Our problems with racism may revolve around an inability to read someone's gestures. Learning to empathize with the
racial other would mean opening up what one could feel for.
Husserl describes the original encounter with the other as
naturally empathic. However, our projection of the other's psychic life weaves itself into signals sent by the body. Therefore, in
the case of the racial other, we must learn to expand our natural
empathy to include those who look and behave differently from
ourselves. I believe Husserl invites us to do so through fantasy.
Fantasy, used as an exercise in empathy, provides the means to
project onto the racial other thoughts, feelings, and dreams like
our own. In these times of racial tension, there is value to be understood in someone who can get another's motivations right.
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PLATO'S BEARD

Reflections
SJSU Department ofPhilosophy students, faculty, and alumni

We asked people in the department to answer one of a series of
questions. Following are quotes from the few brave souls that replied.

1) What does philosophy have to contribute to society?
George Bernard Shaw once said "The reasonable man
adapts himself to the world; the unreasonable one persists in trying
to adapt the world to himself. Therefore, all progress depends on
the unreasonable man." If this is true, then philosophy is made up
of reasonable people (a criticism to which most philosophers would
not object). We adapt ourselves to our present situations, and explain them using jargon too complicated for the layman to comprehend. Even worse, we adapt the theories that other philosophers
have formulated and thoroughly explained, in order to adapt to the
world in which we live. We do this so that we can understand our
existential and social circumstances. Thereupon, we sit around in
classrooms and small intellectual circles and explain, re-explain,
and complicate theories, to the point where we become stagnant
participants in society.
So, What does philosophy contribute to society? A mass
of reasonable men and women; professors and students of philosophy,who as a group are ridiculed and mocked by what, Dostoyevsky
referred to as the "men of action." The question now is 'how can
we contribute to society?' The answer: by speaking to the common person, those who are part of society, those that resist in order
to exist. How do we speak to them? In the language of participation; by infiltrating their social spheres; through direct interaction
in political movements; by speaking to the youth, the uneducated,
and the dogmatic. Only in this way can we make the world understand us, our ideas, our solutions, and our enthusiasm for the welfare of the human race. We must all become unreasonable in order
to obtain progress. Only then can we say that philosophy contrib-
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utes to society.
Carlos A. Sanchez, SJSUgraduate student
I see a world that is oriented more and more toward specialization and technical knowledge. Technical knowledge in certain areas is valued highly and rewarded handsomely. Philosophy
combats all forms of narrowness, dogma, and the uncritical acceptance of the way things are. It opens possibilities, creates alternative visions, fosters critical awareness. It sometimes shocks the
complacent, which is good. At its best, it can reveal with perfect
clarity injustice, ignorance, and spur change for a better world.

Anonymous
Over the years, I have been increasingly concerned about
two things. The first is the Jerry Springering of our public discourse as slogans and volume are lionized in place of thoughtful
dialogue. The second is the feeling of powerlessness that so many
of my students express. I think that Philosophy can be the antidote
to both these ills. Philosophy teaches us to be thoughtful and respectful in our interactions with others. It also is very empowering
because it teaches us how to frame and defend our deeply held
values. Of course, it is important to be on guard against philosophical arrogance. This arrogance crops up in two ways--it encourages us to think that if we are more articulate, we are more
likely to be right; and it can make us forget the many non-discursive ways in which value can be expressed and defended. [This
response was intended for questions one and two]

ProfessorRita Manning, SJSU DepartmentofPhilosophy
2) What significance has philosophy bad in your life?
Actually, it had a major significance. It allowed me to
change my entire outlook towards life and myself. Without the
philosophical research that I did at a very pinnacle time in my life,
I would not be the person I am today. Philosophy helped me realize that my thoughts and opinions were important, and have a major role in how my life continues.

DonovanIves, SJSUgraduate student
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I started studying philosophy because I was seeking Truth.
To my disappointment and relief, I am finding out that there is no
Truth ... and that is a true statement if I ever heard one. So, philosophy has confused me and taught me that my confusion is quite
normal; even the greatest thinkers on Earth cannot find Truth ...
what a relief! Maybe the Zen monks are right: "One cannot think
Truth ... one must live Truth by Being Truth"(Heideggerian emphasis mine).

Dirk Bruins, SJSU graduatestudent
For me, philosophy has been and is an expansion and analysis of the question.

Benjamin Ten Cate, SJSU undergraduate student

3) What is the "good life?"
Alife where every thought it has aims to be kind to others,
and aims to inspire kindness and happiness and love in others. A
life where every emotion it feels shows compassion and tolerance
for others. A life where every action it does has the wisdom to
achieve the aims of its thoughts.

Martin Squibbs, SJSU alumni

4) How do you explain your interest in philosophy to those
that do not understand your goals?
Everybody lives by a philosophy. It guides their actions
and the way they live life. Philosophy affects how they see the
world and what they appreciate. Studying philosophy helps me
understand those around me, appreciate their ideas, and see how I
can improve my beliefs .

Wayne Yuen, SJSU undergraduate student
If the explanation cannot relate in some way to your life,
then what value is philosophy?

PaulBashaw, SJSU graduate student
I have to confess I do not ever need to explain. My whole
being exhibits itself philosophically. My guess is that most folks I
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run into have little interest in being like me. However, I will say
that most folks, once stimulated to a dialog, have many significant
things to say that could be tapped into with a tug from philosophy.

James Dix, SJSU undergraduate student
What is my end to which philosophy is a means?
Humanity needs a continuance granted
To bury God deep within the earth
And complete the destruction of his former address
To walk through nothingness
And know what you manifest
Intentionally creating and sustaining
A Garden of Eden
A compassionate ecology deep enough
To draw even those rationally immune
To extinction
The widowed Goddess
Grows moody
And ravenous...

Melanie Morra, SJSU graduate student
5) What is the really important question?
I think the important questions are in ethics, but I think we
are all wrong in answering.

Professor Ruth Manor, SJSUDepartment ofPhilosophy
Ruth is not quite right. Is asking "what is the really important question" important?

Professor PeterHadreas, SJSU Department ofPhilosophy
This question is the really important one. This is the
first question I asked myself when I realized questions, and this is
the first question that I will ask my first class and every class afterwards. In asking this question, I return the task of thinking back to
those that seek wisdom. This places responsibility for enlightenment upon the unenlightened, and may disrupt their belief that
wisdom is something that I can pour into their ears like facts. I
solicit this question because this question is quite large, yet very
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small at the same time. It is large because it is open-ended. It's
small because if bothers the psyche like a bad rash, and begs for an
answer. Answering reveals to me my student' highest values. In
answering, they will think. In thinking, they will pursue their highest values and perhaps will find answers that are both intensely
personal and universal to the point of being timeless.
Tony Nguyen, SlSU graduate student
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Afterthoughts
Reader Commentaries
We will gladly accept commentaries on the essays contained in
this issue of GEIST. We hope to print some of them in the next
issue.
Send to: GEIST, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, One Washington Square, San Jose, CA. 95192-0069
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Call For Papers
We welcome papers on any philosophical topic. To submit a paper, please send a hardcopy and softcopy of your paper with a cover
page. All papers should be double spaced, 12-point font, approximately 5 to 10 pages in length , and marked clearly with the applicants last four digits of social security number. The cover page
should contain the applicant 's name, school affiliation , undergraduate or graduate status, phone number, mailing address , and last
four digits of social security number. Only one paper per applicant
will be reviewed.
The deadline for submissions: February 1, 2000.

Pleasesend submission directly to:GEIST, Department of Philosophy, San Jose State University, One Washington Square, San
Jose, CA. 95192-0069
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